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THE DILEMMA OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUSINESS 
SYSTEM MODERNIZATION EFFORTS: WHY INTENDED 





Over the last twenty (20) years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
repeatedly found that the Department of Defense’s (DOD) business systems have little 
continuity and that many systems perform similar taskings and were classified as “high 
risk.” Despite this designation being made over twenty (20) years ago, the DOD has made 
little progress implementing the GAO’s recommendations.  
The intent of this joint applied project (JAP) is not to merely discuss prior 
recommendations and findings regarding the DOD’s business system modernization 
program from the GAO and other stakeholders, but to identify and thoroughly discuss root 
cause(s) that have prohibited the DOD from achieving full-implementation over the past 
twenty (20) years. The goal of this research is to expand upon data and information that is 
available through published literature and other sources by applying the unique work 
experiences of the authors as DOD Contact Specialists, as well as the authors’ academic 
perspectives resulting from knowledge obtained through the Contract Management cohort 
at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Based on the authors’ experience and familiarity, the 
emphasis of this research was on the DOD contract writing systems (CWS).  
This JAP seeks to report on the progress of DOD business system modernization 
efforts and develop a better way forward based on the findings to the following primary 
research questions:  
1) What was the catalyst for the DOD’s recent business systems modernization 
efforts, and what is the current nature of that need? 
2) Why has the DOD failed to fully meet its business systems modernization 
objectives in a timely manner? 
3) What additional action is needed for the DOD to fully achieve intended outcomes 
of its business system modernization objectives? 
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4) Are there other potential outcomes of DOD’s business systems modernization 
efforts that have not been previously accounted for, or particular focus areas that 
may yield better results? 
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In 1995, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report designating 
the Department of Defense (DOD) business systems as high risk. The DOD is responsible 
for seven (7) of GAO’s high risk areas, including: DOD’s approach to business 
transformation, support infrastructure, financial management, supply chain management, 
weapon system acquisition, and contract management (Department of Defense, 2015).  
 Since that time, the GAO has made over 200 recommendations to strengthen DOD 
modernization efforts and reduce risks related to the modernization efforts (DOD Business 
System Modernization, 2016). However, the DOD is experiencing ongoing difficulties of 
implementing procedures and controls, which would allow for the proper management of 
the modernization effort while at the same time minimizing risks (DOD Business System 
Modernization, 2016).  
Since the high risk designation by GAO, many important policies and regulations 
have been issued, however, of particular importance was the issuance of Section 332 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, which required 
the DOD to take specific actions based upon GAO’s recommendations (GAO, 2015). The 
NDAA also required that milestones for the modernization efforts be established, and, in 
order for funding to be provided for modernization, DOD must show that progress has been 
with respect to streamlining each system (GAO, 2015). The act also details that the DOD 
must, to the maximum extent practicable, use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems 
that are modified to meet the DOD’s unique requirements and to remove unique interfaces 
that inhibit competition.  
This Joint Applied Project (JAP) examines the policy, regulations, and reports that 
have been issued on the topic of business system modernization efforts within the DOD 
and takes an in depth analysis at the progress made toward acquisition related business 
systems, specifically CWSs. Specifically, a CWS is any computer-based system used 
within the Federal Government to create solicitations, contracts, and modification 
documents (Lloyd, 2012). Because the DOD business systems environment is incredibly 
 xx 
complex, as such, this JAP focused on analysis of CWSs being utilized by the authors to 
better enable the identification of specific improvement areas—SPS, SeaPort-e, and 
PADDS CWSs. Using the selected three (3) CWSs, the JAP focused on the background, 
key functionalities, and problems/issues associated with each of the aforementioned CWSs. 
Using these case studies, in-depth analyses were formed, which, ultimately led to 
recommendations for improving DOD’s business system modernization efforts.   
Following the review of the CWS, the authors utilized an analytical model to assess 
the current state of the DOD CWSs and provided three (3) alternatives for implementation: 
1) Alternative 1 – Enterprise Wide CWS 
2) Alternative 2 – Department Specific CWS 
3) Alternative 3 – Maintain Status Quo  
The three (3) alternatives were then evaluated based on the utilization six (6) 
evaluation criteria—resources, the complexity of implementation, infrastructure, 
compatibility, GAO compliance, and cybersecurity risk. Using the established criteria an 
analysis was conducted to dissect the current state of the DOD CWS, and, ultimately 
provide a recommendation for implementation. The authors offered (7) recommendations 
to help address maturity gaps; however, the below listed recommendations, in particular, 
provide for a more focused approached on DOD’s CWSs. 
1) Recommendation 5: Focus modernization efforts more exclusively on CWS 
development and implementation  
2) Recommendation 6: Implement Alternative 2 (Department Specific CWS) 
While the seven (7) recommendations provided by the authors are not intended to 
be all-inclusive of potential improvement areas, the authors contend that the proffered 
recommendations will adequately address DOD’s business system modernization efforts. 
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Delivering modernized business systems is at the heart of the Department 
of Defense (DOD) efforts to transform its business operations. These 
systems include timeworn and duplicative systems that support DOD 
business operations. Since 1995, Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has designated the department’s business systems modernization efforts as 
high risk. Because DOD spends over $10 billion each year on its business 
systems, the potential for identifying (and avoiding) the costs associated 
with duplicative functionality across its business systems investment is 
significant. (GAO-11-318SP, 2011a) 
The purpose of this Joint Applied Project (JAP) is to discuss the prior 
recommendations and findings regarding the DOD business systems modernization 
program from the GAO and other stakeholders, as well as identify and thoroughly discuss 
root cause(s) that have prohibited DOD from achieving full-implementation of prior 
recommendations over the past twenty (20) years. Figure 1 illustrates the number of DOD 
business systems. This research will examine the areas of the Acquisition business systems, 
with a specific concentration on contract writing system(s) (CWS) used within the DOD. 
The above mentioned GAO report was in response to new statutory legislation that 
required the GAO to identify initiatives that have duplicate functions throughout the 
government and various federal programs. Part of Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 29 
(2010), 31 U.S.C. § 712, this report requires GAO to report to these findings to congress 
annually in order to allow policymakers to make informed decisions in response to the 
fiscal pressures that make up the current economic environment.   Due to the decreasing 
DOD budget, successfully modernizing the business system becomes more difficult every 
year while receiving more and more visibility. In terms of technology, it is known that the 
Federal Government lags the private sector and still uses antiquated technology first 
introduced in the early 1970s. Following a detailed analysis of the DOD business system 
modernization program, recommendations will be provided for improvement, with a 
concentrated focus on DOD CWSs 
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Figure 1.  Certified and Approved Department of Defense Business Systems  
 
Source: GAO 15-627 (2015b)  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To report on the progress of DOD business systems modernization efforts, and 
develop a better way forward, the following research questions will be asked: 
1. What was the catalyst for the DOD’s recent business systems modernization 
efforts, and what is the current nature of that need? 
2. Why has the DOD failed to fully meet its business systems modernization 
objectives in a timely manner? 
a. Is there adequate representation from functional/execution-related 
personnel to fully demonstrate the scope of problem(s) / issue(s)? 
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b. How entrenched are legacy systems within each service / 
component, and how feasible is it to change the status quo? 
c. Is DOD resourced (e.g., personnel, funding, facilities/technology, 
etc.) appropriately for this effort? 
3. What additional action is needed for the DOD to fully achieve intended 
outcomes of its business system modernization objectives? 
a. Is DOD resourced (personnel, funding, facilities/technology, etc.) 
appropriately for this effort? 
b. Is there a more effective organizational structure/model for Chief 
Management Officer (CMO)/Deputy Chief Management Officer 
(DCMO) and other stakeholders who are responsible for this effort? 
4. Are there other potential outcomes of DOD’s business system 
modernization efforts that have not been previously accounted for, or 
particular focus areas that may yield better results? 
a. What are the risks associated with prior recommendations from 
GAO and other stakeholders? 
b. Are there better recommendations not previously accounted for? 
c. Are there specific focus areas (e.g., contract writing system(s), 
integrated contract/financial system(s), etc.) that should be 
emphasized over other areas? 
C. SCOPE 
This project will attempt to identify and thoroughly discuss root cause(s) that have 
prohibited DOD from achieving full-implementation of prior recommendations from GAO 
(and other stakeholders) regarding its business system modernization program. This will 
be accomplished through the following: 
1. Expand upon data or information available through published literature. 
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2. Review GAO reports and recommendations on business system 
modernization efforts. 
3. Analyze past and current business system modernization efforts to assess 
areas in need for further improvement. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this JAP will be based upon data or information available through 
published literature to include procurement related policies, audits, Appropriation Bills, 
and various reports. The analysis of the research material is based upon academic 
perspectives resulting from knowledge obtained through the workplace and our curriculum 
at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), specifically the use of analytical framework to 
appropriately analyze the problem and provide a recommendation for implementation. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS  
This JAP makes the assumption that the reader has a basic understanding of the 
DOD business systems, specifically the complexities and current challenges that exist 
within the antiquated DOD contract writing systems. This JAP also makes the assumption 
that the reader has an understanding of Information Technology (IT) terminology and 
concepts.  
F. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
Defense Business System (DBS) – “An information system, other than a national 
security system, operated by, for, or on behalf of the DOD, including financial systems, 
mixed systems, financial data feeder systems, and information technology and information 
assurance infrastructure, used to support business activities, such as acquisition, financial 
management, logistics, strategic planning and budgeting, installations and environment, 
and human resource management” (Public Law 108-375, 2004).  
Defense business system modernization – “The acquisition or development of a new 
defense business system; or any significant modification or enhancement of an existing 
defense business system” (Public Law 108-375, 2004). 
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Contract Writing System (CWS) – The term “contract writing system” is not defined 
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or the DOD Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS), nor is it included with the definitions of other related terms within 
Public Law 108–375 or Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222. This JAP refers to CWSs in the same 
manner as Robert E. Lloyd in his fall 2012 article entitled “Public Contract Writing 
Systems: A House Divided” as published in the Journal of Public Procurement. 
Specifically, a CWS is any computer-based system used within the Federal Government to 
create solicitations, contracts, and modification documents (Lloyd, 2012). 
Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) – The transition plan for implementing the 
Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) for defense business systems (FY 2014 Enterprise 
Transition Plan (ETP) Overview, 2014). The 2014 ETP Overview identifies an ETP as the 
desired set of business and IT capabilities as well as defines how the DOD will transition 
from current state to the target defense business systems computing environment within a 
specified timeframe.  
Legacy system – Any system with a sunset date within thirty-six (36) months of the 
date of the certification approval, or for non-covered defense business systems, enduring 
systems with operations and support life cycle dates of less than thirty-six (36) months 
from the start of the fiscal year in Organizational Execution Plan (OEP) (FY 2014 
Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) Overview, 2014). The 2014 ETP Overview goes on to 
state that legacy systems are not required to undertake efforts to assert Business Enterprise 
Architecture (BEA) compliance but must identify a sunset date and the system(s) it is being 
replaced by. In addition, the source states that legacy systems are not allowed to obligate 
modernization dollars. 
G. STUDY ORGANIZATION 
This JAP is organized into seven (7) chapters. Chapter I introduces the research 
project, outlines the research objectives, identifies the research questions, author 
assumptions, and methodologies used to construct the JAP. Chapter II provides 
background information, to include the evolution of policy and reform that have shaped 
the DOD business system modernization program. This chapter covers multiple National 
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Defense Authorization Acts, the Clinger-Cohen Act, and various GAO and DODIG 
reports. Chapter III discusses the current procurement system environment. This discussion 
will consist of the current governance and organizations with influence over the 
modernization effort, as well as, the current strategic plan and future goals. Chapter IV 
presents case studies that are relevant to the CWS portion of DOD’s business system 
modernization efforts. Specifically, the case studies will provide the historical background 
and functionalities for the following three (3) CWSs that are currently being utilized by the 
authors: SPS, SeaPort-e, and PADDS. Chapter V applies an analytical framework to better 
address problems pertaining to DOD’s business system modernization efforts, and includes 
an evaluation of three (3) potential CWS alternatives. Chapter VI provides 
recommendations for the purposes of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s 
utilization of electronic procurement systems to accomplish its mission objectives. These 
recommendations will be based on information presented herein, as well as the authors’ 
conclusions based on applicable work experience. Finally, Chapter VII will provide the 
authors’ overall conclusions as a result of this research endeavor.   
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the problems of DOD business system modernization 
efforts and framed the outline of this research project. Specifically, this chapter identified 
the scope of this JAP as well as presented the four (4) research questions that this research 
project will address. Finally, the methodology was described in how this analysis was 
conducted. The next chapter will provide a detailed timeline and background of the 
evolution of policy reform within the DOD, with particular emphasis on that of DOD 
business systems.  
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II. EVOLUTION OF POLICY REFORM 
Chapter I provided an introduction to the background of this research project and 
described the research questions that this JAP will address. This chapter will focus on the 
evolution of policy reform within the DOD, specifically highlighting the historical 
information that led to the DOD business system modernization being designated as high 
risk over twenty (20) years ago. This chapter will go into greater detail about additional 
reports, policies, and documentation that have created this problem. 
As emphasized by GAO-15-627 (DOD Business System Modernization), the 
current DOD systems are excessively complex and, due to this attribute, the systems are 
prone to issues and malfunctions. The GAO also found that there is little to no continuity, 
that the DOD has several systems completing the same tasking (which lead to the same 
data being saved in multiple locations), as well as, an unnecessary amount of manual data 
entry (GAO 15-627, 2015b). This chapter reviews the policies, regulations, reports, and 
acts that impacted the DOD business system modernization efforts from 1995 to 2015; 
while examining the GAO high risk designation and the regulations that have been issued 
to mitigate the risk assessment.   
A. BACKGROUND 
The DOD spends billions of dollars annually on its modernization efforts, which 
consist of over 2,300 business systems that support all aspects of operations and business 
functions (GAO 15-627, 2015b).  
GAO designated DOD’s multibillion dollar business systems 
modernization program as high risk in 1995, and since then has provided a 
series of recommendations aimed at strengthening its institutional approach 
to modernizing its business system investments. Section 332 of the NDAA 
for Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, as amended, requires the department to take 
specific actions consistent with GAO’s prior recommendations and 
included a provision for GAO to review DOD’s efforts. In addition, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee Report for the NDAA for FY 2015 
included a provision for GAO to evaluate the usefulness and effectiveness 
of DOD’s business enterprise architecture and business process 
reengineering processes. (GAO 15-627, 2015b)  
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B. ACTS, GAO, AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR 
GENERAL (DODIG) REPORTS  
1. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005  
Section 332 of Public Law 108–375, also known as the “Ronald W. Reagan 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005” amended Chapter 131 of Title 
10 U.S.C. § 2222, by inserting the following new section, “Defense business systems: 
architecture, accountability, and modernization.” Under this act, an annual report is 
submitted by 15 March to various congressional defense committees in order to ensure 
compliance with the requirements of the NDAA for FY 05 (GAO 15-627, 2015b). As 
amended, NDAA for FY 2005, requires the DOD accomplish tasks consistent with prior 
suggestions made by the GAO. Section 332 of the act addresses the following provisions: 
a) Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) 
b) Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) 
c) Investment Management 
d) Investment Certification and Approval (ICA) 
e) Mandated Budgetary Reporting 
f) Other (Human Capital) 
In addition, this NDAA requires that the DOD submit the following information to 
the appropriate congressional committees in an annual report on compliance with the 
provisions outlined in the act: 
Detail actions taken and milestones for meeting the acts requirements. 
Specific milestones and performance metrics against stated performance 
measures, along with any amendments. Executions on any system 
modernization submitted for certification under the appropriate subsection. 
Detail specific improvements in business operations and cost savings 
initiatives on successful modernization efforts. Detail the number of system 
modernizations that have been certified; and, identify any obligation in 
excess of $1 million for the system modernization that has not been certified 
the prior year. (Public Law 108-375, 2004)  
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The NDAA for FY 2005 consists of various requirements, one of which states that 
the DOD should implement milestones to ensure the modernization effort is kept on track 
and establish metrics to capture performance data, funding needs, and non-financial needs. 
The NDAA for FY 2005 asserts that in order for funding to be approved for specific 
business systems, the DOD must demonstrate the organization has taken the appropriate 
steps required to guarantee that each system is as streamlined and efficient as possible. The 
act also details that the DOD must, to the maximum extent practicable, use commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) systems that are modified to meet the DOD’s unique requirements 
and to remove unique interfaces that inhibit competition (GAO 15-627, 2015b).  
Contained within Section 332 of NDAA for FY 2005 is language that requires that 
the DOD must have the GAO assess the specific actions taken as part of the modernization 
effort that allows for an independent audit on modernization progress. A summary of the 
status of the implementation of those recommendations is contained in Table 1. A more 
detailed listing of GAO recommendations is provided by Appendix A.  
Table 1.   NDAA for FY 2005: Status of Recommendations  
NDAA provision Implemented Partially 
Implemented 
Total 
Business Enterprise Architecture  1  2  3  
Enterprise Transition Plan  -  1  1  
Investment Management  1  3  4  
Investment Certification and Approval  2  3  5  
Mandated Budgetary Reporting  1  -  1  
Other (Human Capital)  -  2  2  
Total  5 11 16 
Source: GAO 15-627 (2015b) 
 
2. Clinger-Cohen Act 
The Clinger-Cohen Act, enacted in 1996, was implemented to improve how the 
Government procures and disposes of IT hardware. This act also requires the DOD to 
appoint a Chief Information Officer (CIO) that has authority to ensure various aspects of 
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the act are implemented appropriately and successfully, thus creating accountability. The 
Act also holds the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) accountable 
for the improvement in the procurement through discarding of IT by the federal 
government (Clinger-Cohen Act, 2015).  
3. GAO Reports 
Since 1995, the GAO has stated the modernization of business systems is high-risk 
to the Government and has also issued multiple reports covering the progress with the 
modernization efforts. Section 804 of the Bob Stump NDAA for FY 2003 requires the 
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the DOD to implement various process 
improvements. Similar requirements have also been outlined in Section 332 of NDAA for 
FY 2005. Each statue requires that the DOD submit an annual report on the required aspects 
of the modernization efforts. The report is to contain specific actions taken and milestones 
met for meeting the requirements, detail specific improvements in operations and cost 
savings initiatives, the number of systems certified, and to identify any obligation on a 
system that exceeds $1 million. The modernization topic is of such a great importance due 
to the fact that the DOD allocates billions of dollars annually in order to maintain existing 
systems, as well as, develop new IT systems in order to support the warfighter and execute 
the mission. In 2011, it was reported that the DOD have over two thousand (2,000) IT 
systems in use that are covered by statutory requirements.  
The GAO has performed multiple studies on the modernization effort by analyzing 
key information about each business system architecture in relation to identified core 
elements of the Enterprise Architecture Management Framework. Figure 2 provides a 
timeline of the various business system modernization reports issued by GAO. When 
evaluating the DOD’s compliance with the act, the GAO analyzed policy and procedures 
of investment management, certification documentation for applicable system investments, 
and the latest transition plan. The cases below represent only a cross section of the available 
GAO reports, but show the gains and losses experienced by the DOD. 
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Figure 2.  Timeline of GAO Reports  
 
 
 GAO 09-888: DOD Software and System Process Improvement 
In the GAO-09-888 report, it was found that while OSD had implemented various 
process improvements that were required by statute, OSD had failed to implement any 
oversight measures in order to capture required metrics. OSD countered that “process 
improvement is a component of responsibility and thus it does not view oversight of 
component Software and System Process Improvement (SSPI) efforts as necessary” (GAO 
09-888, 2009). According to the GAO, due to the lack of strong leadership over these 
efforts, OSD is not compliant with elements of Section 804 of the NDAA for FY 2003.   
The GAO also found that while the DOD had implemented various process 
improvements, two (2) processes were not implemented in the mandated timeframe and 
that the implemented processes did not accurately fulfill the intent of the statue and other 


























































 GAO 10–663: Business Systems Modernization 
In the DOD’s FY 2010 report, the GAO found the content was incomplete, not 
capturing the appropriate rate of information needed to permit the meaningful oversight 
and understanding. The GAO stated that while the report included pertinent information, 
“other important performance measures, such as measures of progress against program 
cost, capability, and benefit commitments were not included in the report” (GAO 10-663, 
2010). DOD officials countered that the lack of pertinent information was because these 
investments have not “progressed far enough in their life cycles to measure cost, capability, 
and benefit performance” (GAO 10-663, 2010). However, the GAO review found that the 
report did contain information on multiple investments that have produced savings and, 
therefore, these other investments can provide the same level of information related to 
program expenditures. The GAO also noted the DOD failed to provide key information 
about system investments due to the lack of reliable inventory of all DOD business systems.   
The report stated that the DOD can report on investments relative to expected costs even if 
capabilities and or benefits have not been partially or fully delivered. To further this lack 
of information, the DOD also had not fully defined policies and procedures at the corporate 
or component level. Based on these findings, the GAO indicated that some of the 
certification actions exclude meaningful and material information about known 
weaknesses in the system investments and the resulting actions are not sufficiently 
substantiated. Therefore, the provided congressional report was of “questionable 
reliability” due to the information used to substantiate and support budget requests and 
transition plans (GAO 10-663, 2010).  
The GAO report details the metrics for key milestone statuses. Of the two hundred 
and twenty-four (224) acquisition, compliance and interim milestones:  one hundred and 
twenty-six (126) were met, forty-six (46) were deleted and fifty-two (52) were delayed 
(GAO 10-663, 2010). However, when broken down, sixty-six (66%) percent of acquisition 
milestones and fifty (50%) percent of compliance milestones were not being met.   
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 GAO 11-902: Organizational Transformation 
The GAO found that the DOD agencies and the Army concurred that a plan should 
be developed for meeting elements contained within the GAO framework; however, the 
Navy and Air Force did not concur with the recommended plan. While the DOD and Army 
concurred, the Navy and Air Force did not. The DOD countered that both the Navy and 
Air Force do not have the “valid business case” for that would warrant the execution of all 
framework components (GAO, GAO 11-902, 2011b). This report shows that on average 
the DOD has only fully satisfied twenty (20%) percent of elements, partially satisfied forty-
four (44%) percent of elements, and not satisfied thirty-seven (37%) percent of identified 
elements (GAO 11-902, 2011b). 
DOD officials have listed various issues that have impeded the modernization 
efforts to include lack of human capital resources with the applicable experience in upper 
management and a lack of funding (GAO 11-902, 2011b). Overall, the GAO once again 
concluded that the DOD is not positioned to fully maximize potential benefits of 
modernization efforts to include reducing the cost associated with “duplicative 
functionality” (GAO 11-902, 2011b).  
 GAO 12-685: DOD Business Systems Modernization  
As with previous reports, the GAO reiterated the DOD’s inability to fully 
demonstrate its capacity to gather metrics in order to accurately measure the success of the 
modernization process. The GAO found that the DOD still has “not fully defined roles and 
responsibilities associated with the effort” and that the DOD still lacks a comprehensive 
database of all the business systems utilized by the department. While the DOD included 
data on over one thousand six hundred (1,600) systems for the FY 2013 submission, the 
GAO found that this lack of a comprehensive list potentially includes five-hundred (500) 
business systems, thus bringing to total of potential systems up to 2,100. It was also stated 
that the DOD still has yet to implement GAO Information Technology Investment 
Management framework key practices since the last review in 2011.   
As with previous reports, the GAO again highlighted the DOD’s inability to gather 
and analyze metrics in order to realize the full benefits of the modernization efforts. The 
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GAO noted that the DOD approved one hundred and ninety-eight (198) actions to run 
through the certification process that represents about $2.2 billion of the total 
modernization spending. While these actions were determined to need certification, 
decertification, or recertification, the GAO stated that the documentation for the basis of 
these actions is limited and, therefore, the grounds for which approvals were made are 
incomplete (GAO 12-685, 2012). 
 GAO 13-557: DOD Business Systems Modernization 
The GAO found that the DOD still has challenges in regards to fulfilling certain 
actions to be compliant with NDAA for FY 2005 mandates. The act required that the DOD 
develop business enterprise architecture systems; however, the DOD still lacks a detailed 
implementation plan even though $379 million has been spent over ten (10) years. The act 
also requires that the DOD develop a transition plan, but the GAO found the latest version 
is missing key elements of the acts requirements (i.e., time-phased milestones and 
performance measures). The DOD also has to “establish an investment approval and 
accountability structure along with an investment review process,” but the GAO found that 
the DOD still has not fully defined “the criteria and procedures for making portfolio-based 
investment decisions” nor a process (GAO 13-557, 2013). Lastly the act required that the 
DOD certify any system in excess of $1 million as compliant. While the DOD’s approach 
included certifying over one thousand and two hundred (1,200) business systems for FY 
2013 estimated at $6.8 billion, the DOD still has not ensured the accuracy of the system 
alignments through validation. The GAO also reported that reengineering assertions were 
not finalized and the outcomes were not contained in the submitted report (GAO 13-557, 
2013).  
During the FY 2013 review, the GAO found that the DOD has not defined a 
strategic approach to managing human capital requirements which restricts how 
successfully the DOD can address the acts requirements. This restriction puts the billions 
of dollars spent each year on over two thousand (2,000) systems at risk.   Previous 
recommendations targeted “at achieving activities related to the business system 
modernization effort”; however, the DOD has not implemented over forty-five (45%) 
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percent or twenty-nine (29) recommendations (GAO 13-557, 2013). The DOD claims 
personnel turnover and changes to the requirements which expanded the scope of targeted 
systems that require certification and that the short timeline in which these activities have 
to be accomplished contributed to the noted GAO weaknesses.   
 GAO 14-486: DOD Business Systems Modernization  
In 2014, the GAO found that the DOD certified and approved most of the business 
systems and updated the required transition plan, determining it to be compliant with the 
NDAA for FY 2005. However, the GAO reiterated the DOD’s ongoing challenge in 
implementing certain requirements of the act. While the DOD has developed a framework 
that reflected various best practices, the GAO stated that the framework is not aligned and 
is lacking a review board that solely focuses of systems that are determined to be high risk. 
It was found that while the DOD certified roughly $6.4 billion expenditures for almost one 
thousand and two hundred (1,200) business systems; however, additional reviews are 
necessary to support the certifications and that department guidance does not mandate that 
pertinent information be collected to reduce duplication of business systems (GAO 14-486, 
2014). However, unlike previous reports, GAO Report 14-486 concluded that the DOD did 
in fact make progress in the development of a transition plan included most of the 
documentation required by the act.   
 GAO 15-290: High-Risk Series  
The GAO reported to congressional committee a High-Risk Series report updating 
progress on prior recommendations. The DOD segment of this report represents only part 
of the $3.5 trillion in outlays for FY 2014. This annual report examined the DOD’s 
approach to business transformation, modernization efforts, managing infrastructure, 
financial and supply chain management, as well as, weapon system acquisition.   While the 
GAO found that the DOD has “demonstrated” commitment to improve transformation 
efforts, unless the DCMO addresses prior issues (metrics to measure performance), the 
progress needed to transform the DOD into a more efficient and less costly entity will not 
happen (GAO 15-290, 2015a).    
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This report also focused on the lack of monitoring necessary for the assessment and 
reporting of progress. The GAO stated that the DOD still has not established protocol for 
monitoring the progress on the business transformation efforts across all the business 
functions impacted by this effort. It was noted by the GAO that the DCMO did not provide 
feedback to reporting officials, it was unknown if the information being submitted was 
complete or clear. However, the DCMO office later stated that the data provided by these 
reporting officials were unclear and not consistent across all functions. The GAO noted 
that unless standard reporting protocols and metrics are established and implemented, the 
DOD cannot determine the actual extent these efforts are helping achieve the 
modernization mission (GAO 15-290, 2015a).   
While this report addressed the DOD Leadership’s commitment to modernization 
efforts, it stated that additional steps are necessary to focus on key portfolio practices 
documented in the IT Investment Management Framework.   As with other reports, the 
GAO once again determined that the appropriate information (cost, schedule, and 
performance) is reported and accurate in order to measure and demonstrate that the DOD 
is making progress in achieving expectations.   The GAO also determined that the DOD 
needs to ensure that the appropriate level of resources is being allocated by conduction 
needs assessments and by ensuring the appropriate roles and responsibilities are established 
for future systems.   
 GAO 15-627: DOD Business Systems Modernization 
The GAO preformed the study due to “the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Report for the NDAA for FY 2015 which included a provision that the entity evaluate the 
effectiveness of the DOD’s business enterprise architecture and reengineering processes,” 
(GAO 15-627, 2015b). In GAO 15-627 the GAO interviewed twenty-four (24) military 
department portfolio managers and other officials (GAO 15-627, 2015b).    
Since 2011, the DOD has implemented five (5) of the sixteen (16) 
recommendations that addressed the provisions contained in the NDAA for FY 2005 and 
partially implemented eleven (11) of the recommendations. While progress had been made, 
the GAO made the determination that the efforts still are not achieving the expected and 
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intended results outlined in the statute.   As reported in the aforementioned survey, portfolio 
managers stated that efforts were only reasonably effective in streamlining processes, 
current ineffective architecture systems constrained business system investments, and that 
the architecture could not produce dependable and timely data for the purposes of making 
informed decisions. The managers surveyed also reported a cultural resistance to change 
and a lack of necessary skills which contributed to the DOD’s ability to achieve the acts 
envisioned results. It was also noted that if the DOD implemented the portfolio managers 
suggestions, that the DOD would achieve greater efficiencies in cost and performance and, 
therefore, better outcomes (GAO 15-627, 2015b).   
4. DODIG REPORTS  
 DODIG 2012-111 Increased Risks to DOD Auditability Goals 
Due to increasing costs and delayed schedules, Congress made a request for the 
DODIG to audit various DOD ERP systems. This audit was conducted in order to evaluate 
six (6) specific ERP systems required to produce “auditable financial statements” (DODIG, 
DODIG 2012-111, 2012). Information pertaining to each of these systems are provided in 
Table 2. The DODIG audit revealed that these six (6) ERP systems cost the taxpayer $8.0 
billion over the initial estimate and took up to twelve and a half (12.5) years to implement 
and deploy the system. In this DODIG report, it stated that due to the reported delays, the 
use of antiquated technology will decrease the projected savings that would be realized 
with system modernization. The DODIG also stated that the continued use of antiquated 













of System Users 
Planned Number 
of Legacy 
Systems to Be 
Replaced 
Army     
GFEBS 2008 46,000 53,000 107 
LMP 2003 21,000 21,000 2 
Navy     
Navy ERP 2007 40,000 66,000 96 
Air-Force     
DEAMS 2007 1,200 30,000 8 
DOD     
DAI 2008 8,000 94,000 15 
EBS-EC 2011 Unknown 700 7 
EBS-EProcurement 2010 1,500 4,000 3 
Source:  DODIG, 2012-111 (2012, p. 12) 
 
As a result of the DODIG 2012-11 audit, it was recommended that the Air Force, 
Army, Navy, DCMO and CMOs implement a methodology to review internal activities in 
order to restrict funding when a system cannot “demonstrate adequate business process 
reengineering,” and also recommended that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) update 
the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan to track the effect of the DOD 
ERP systems on goals of obtaining auditable financial statements (DODIG, DODIG 2012-
111, 2012). While the CMOs agree with the DODIG recommendations, only the Navy 
presented a plan for auditable data (DODIG, DODIG 2012-111, 2012). 
 DODIG 2013–111 Status of Enterprise Resource Planning Systems’ Cost, 
Schedule, and Management Actions Taken to Address Prior 
Recommendations 
After the analysis conducted under DODIG 2012-111, a request was made to update 
the findings during an audit conducted from February–July 2013. The rationale behind the 
audit was to ascertain whether or not there have been increases in cost or missed milestones 
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within the ERP systems since DODIG 2012-111 report (DODIG 2013-111, 2013). Since 
the last DODIG report, the DOD reported a $680.9 million cost reduction in four (4)of the 
six (6) systems highlighted in the previous report, however, a cost increase of $298.9 
million in the other two (2) systems and three (3) additional delays (DODIG 2013-111, 
2013).  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed DOD’s continuous struggle with successfully 
implementing all the requirements of the various National Defense Authorization Acts. 
Part of this struggle is due to different interpretations of the statues’ requirements and lack 
of resources; however, due to technological advances over the last two (2) years, reports 
and findings are not a fixed target, but are continuously updated to mirror the current 
technological environment. As system modernization has progressed, the requirements 
contained within the act have evolved to better match the current technological 
environment. While the DOD has been able to implement some process improvements, the 
GAO concluded annually that the DOD is not fully executing the statute requirements and, 
therefore, did not capitalize on the overall impact of the modernization efforts nor able to 
effectively measure cost, schedule, and performance outcomes of these improvements.  
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III. CURRENT PROCUREMENT SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT 
As thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter, the GAO has issued multiple 
reports stating which programs are determined to be high risk. The DOD is responsible for 
seven (7) of GAO’s high risk areas, including: DOD’s approach to business transformation, 
support infrastructure, financial management, supply chain management, weapon system 
acquisition, and contract management (Department of Defense, 2015b). Many of the 
aforementioned GAO high risk areas are beyond the intended scope of this project; 
however, in order to properly analyze business systems modernization efforts, it is 
important to understand the overall structure in which DOD operates within to implement 
new strategies and corrective actions. Accordingly, this chapter examines various aspects 
of DOD’s organizational structure, stakeholder engagement, and strategic alignment as it 
pertains to necessary improvements to its business operations. This chapter also includes 
an in-depth discussion of DOD’s strategic plan for defense wide procurement capabilities 
with particular emphasis on its CWSs. 
A. GOVERNANCE 
As emphasized by the Department’s Strategic Management Plan (SMP) for FY 
2014–2015, the DOD is a highly complex organization, employing roughly three (3) 
million employees at over five thousand (5,000) locations, and has an annual budget of 
over $600 billion. “With such massive scale and a complex operating environment, it is 
crucial for DOD to efficiently execute its business operations” (Department of Defense, 
2013, p. 6). In order for the DOD to successfully complete its mission, the procurement 
and other related systems are required to be efficient, agile, and effective. The SMP also 
states that effectively overseeing business operations is essential to achieving desired 
outcomes for improved business operations.   
DOD’s recently issued ASP for FY 2015–2018 emphasizes how effective 
management and oversight will drive the strategic goal of a successful implementation. 
The ASP also highlights that in order to achieve desired efficiencies and end goals, all 
leadership within the DOD must collaborate and take the appropriate action, specifically, 
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lead organizations are appointed as response for the cross-Departmental coordination for 
all goals. The stakeholders identified in Figure 3 report to the DMAG and DBC and are 
responsible for the management and implementation of strategic outcomes (Department of 
Defense, 2015b).  
Figure 3.  DOD Governance Forums, Stakeholder Roles, and 
Responsibilities. 
 
 Source: Department of Defense (2015b, p. 39) 
 
1. Deputy’s Management Action Group  
Serving as the DBSMC, the DMAG is accountable for implementing a consistent 
approach towards managing DOD’s processes (Department of Defense, Strategic 
Management Plan (SMP) for Fiscal Years 2014-2015, 2013, p. 9). The DMAG “is the 
primary civilian-military management forum that supports the Secretary of Defense, and 
addresses top Departmental issues that have resource, management, and broad strategic 
and/or policy implications. The DMAG’s primary mission is to produce advice for the DSD 
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in a collaborative environment and to ensure that the DMAG execution aligns with the 
Secretary of Defense’s priorities as well as the planning and programming schedule” 
(Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “Governance,” n.d.). 
2. Defense Business Council  
Section 901 of the NDAA for FY 2012, codified at Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222, 
established the DOD’s single IRB, known as the Defense Business Council (DBC) 
(Department of Defense, 2014, p. 6). The DBC serves as the principal subsidiary body to 
the DMAG “for vetting issues related to management, improvement of defense business 
operations; and other issues to include performance management, pursuant to the 
Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010” (Deputy Chief 
Management Officer, n.d.). The DBC leads efforts to reduce costs and optimize business 
operations as the DOD continues to implement institutional reforms. Because of shared 
interest and responsibilities with regard to business processes and system architecture, the 
DBC is now co-chaired by the DCMO and the CIO while continuing to evaluate 
management and business improvement issues for the DMAG (Department of Defense, 
2015a).  
3. Fourth Estate Working Group and Military Departments 
The DOD Fourth Estate is comprised of organizational entities which are not in the 
Military departments or the Combatant Commands. These include the OSD, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Inspector General, the Defense Agencies, and 
Field Activities (Department of Defense, 2015a). The Fourth Estate business environment 
includes large, diverse organizations performing a complex set of functions. DCMO 
monitors baseline certification data from the Fourth Estate to pursue consolidation and 
business process improvement opportunities. Recent Fourth Estate measures include the 
consolidation and modernization of its portfolio, with server organizations being able to 
accelerate planned retirement of legacy systems or retire systems earlier than projected 
(Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 39). 
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4. Deputy Chief Management Officer   
In 2007, the DCMO was established by Congress as an Under Secretary of Defense 
level position. The DCMO was founded to “synchronize, integrate, and coordinate the 
business operations of the department and ensure optimal alignment in support of the war 
fighting mission” (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.). 
Acting as PSA and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(DSD), the DCMO is paramount in serving as the DOD’s Process Improvement Officer, 
creating a culture that is performance based which is piloted by strategy of cross-functional 
procedures, tracking established metrics, and ensuring requirements are met in a timely 
manner (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.). The 
creation of the DOD’s BEA, SMP, Investment Review Process, and ETP are the primary 
responsibility of the DCMO (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, 
“About,” n.d.).  
In order to fulfill the DCMO core mission, there are seven (7) core service offerings 
that be provided (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.). 
As stated on the DCMO webpage, the seven (7) core service offerings are: 1) DOD business 
strategic planning, performance management, and oversight; 2) successful implementation 
and acquisition oversight of DOD business systems; 3) effective business portfolio and 
investment management; 4) rapid and agile business solutions provided for Combatant 
Commands and other in-theater customers to ensure that expeditionary business process 
work effectively and efficiently; 5) delivering the BEA, standards, and technology 
innovation; 6) E2E business process optimization, integration, and alignment to enable 
informed enterprise-wide decisions; and 7) business intelligence that enables data-driven, 
effective decision-making for DOD and other stakeholders (Deputy Chief Management 
Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.).   
As depicted by Figure 4, the Office of the DCMO is comprised of a combination 
of technical and industry experts that deliver a comprehensive suite of products and 
services through five (5) directorates: Planning Performance & Assessment Directorate; 
Defense Business Management, Analysis, & Optimization Directorate; Oversight & 
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Compliance Directorate; Administration Directorate; and Organizational Policy & 
Decision Support Directorate (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, 
“About,” n.d.). 
Figure 4.  Organizational Structure for the Office of the DCMO. 
 
 
Source: Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About” 
(n.d.) 
 
5. Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) 
The Secretary’s PSAs act as business line owners, and fulfill a key role through the 
development of functional strategies that lay the foundation for the investment 
management process while also establishing the context for portfolio management efforts 
(Department of Defense, 2014, p. 3). 
 26 
6. Components and Agencies 
Comprised of Military of Departments, Defense Agencies, and Field Activities, the 
DOD Components execute and record data on all performance and milestone fulfillment 
(Department of Defense, 2015b, p. 39)  During the investment review cycle, Components 
provide and explain respective roadmaps to the target environment described by the ETP, 
as established by the DCMO and DBC (Department of Defense, 2014, pp. 10-11). 
Components also generate problem statements for DOD’s leadership that document the 
outcomes of investigations pertaining to problems, current capability gaps, and, or areas of 
opportunity (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 5). Additionally, Components provide the 
DBC with various BEA compliance assessments that enable the DBC to better identify and 
resolve risks (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 8). 
7. Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) 
While not depicted in Figure 4, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(DPAP) is another key collaborative stakeholder that drives the successful implementation 
of DOD’s strategic goals (Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, n.d.). Under 
DPAP’s purview are all matters relating to contracting and procurement, to include e-
Business and the resulting implementation of policy through updates to DFARS and DOD 
Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) (Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy, n.d.).   
DPAP is composed of seven (7) directorates, summarized as follows: 1) DPAP 
Operations; 2) Contract Policy and International Contracting; 3) Defense Acquisition 
Regulation System; 4) Contingency Contracting; 5) Program Development and 
Implementation (includes Unique Identification and Purchase Card); 6) Program 
Acquisition; and 7) Services Acquisition / Strategic Sourcing (Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy, n.d.). 
DPAP contributes towards the governance of DOD’s procurement capabilities from 
a functional perspective. Established by statute or regulation, requirements are scrutinized, 
ranked by importance, and then approved for execution by the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) and the Acquisition Committee for e-Gov (ACE). These 
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prerequisites are then classified by those that impact Grants and Cooperative Agreements 
versus contract award processes (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 38).   
As chair of the Procurement Business Operations Requirements Group (PBORG), 
the DPAP Director is responsible for providing authority as it relates to documentation 
standards, organizational procedures, and competencies to be used by all stakeholders 
(Department of Defense, 2016). As indicated in “The Plan,” the PBORG consists of key 
personnel from the Military Departments as well as various Other Defense Agencies. The 
Plan also goes on to reiterate that the primary objective of the PBORG is to “achieve 
efficient and effective business operations through the use of data standards, internal 
controls, enterprise strategies for business systems and services, and electronic interfaces 
promoting systems interoperability, data accuracy, data visibility, and transparency of 
contracting data.”  In order to make the necessary decisions that impact the DOD 
procurement process, the Procurement Data Management Team provides any findings and/
or recommendations to the PBORG (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 38).   
As required by  Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222 and NDAA for FY 2008, DPAP works in 
concert  with other functional sponsors to update the BEA to reflect the various laws, 
regulations, or policies that have been issued (Department of Defense, Strategic Plan for 
Defense Wide Procurement Capabilities (A Functional Strategy), Version 2.1, 2016, p. 8). 
In addition, DPAP has established the DOD Procurement Toolbox (available at 
http://www.dodprocurementtoolbox.com) to provide Components with a web portal to 
highlight the developing compliance criteria and functionality. The intent of the DOD 
Procurement Toolbox is to “document and describe the standards, services, and 
applications” pertinent to the DOD’s procurement processes (Department of Defense, 
2016, p. 8).  
DPAP’s program development and implementation for e-Business includes the 
following: Procurement Data Standard (PDS) and other enterprise initiatives; System for 
Award Management (SAM); Contracting Officer Representative Tracking (CORT) Tool; 
Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS-NG); Electronic 
Subcontracting Reporting System (eSRS); Federal Subaward Reporting System (FSRS); 
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Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS); Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reports System (CPARS); Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps); 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA); Wage Determinations Online 
(WDOL); Clause Logic Service (CLS); Procurement Business Intelligence Service (PBIS); 
and the Wide Area Workflow (WAWF) e-Business Suite (Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy, n.d.).  
B. MEASURING, TRACKING, AND REPORTING PROGRESS 
According to the Plan, the Office of the DCMO controls a collaborative 
brainstorming group that includes the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), the DOD 
Components, and other stakeholders. The Plan also states that the DCMO must perform 
quarterly monitoring of “performance goals, measures, targets, business lines, key 
programs, and activities” (Department of Defense, 2015b). Progress and recommendations 
are closely monitored by DOD leadership to provide oversight and assistance to execute 
the DOD ASP (Department of Defense, 2015b, pp. 38-39). Through the existing 
governance forums depicted in Figure 3, the DOD continually develops the Plan, 
redefining performance goals and business objectives to implement evolving strategies 
(Department of Defense, 2015b, p. 40). 
C. INTEGRATED BUSINESS FRAMEWORK 
The DBC provides the DOD with a context by which to examine and improve 
business operations through its management of the Integrated Business Framework (IBF) 
illustrated in Figure 5.  
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The DOD leverages this cross-functional framework to rationalize system 
investments, as business enablers, by aligning strategy with planned spending (Department 
of Defense, 2014, p. 2). The IBF is aligned with the guiding principles established in the 
SMP/ASP and enables DOD business leaders to instill a cost culture, institutionalize E2E 
business processes, align business operations, and modernize and rationalize business 
systems. The framework offers a critical and comprehensive structure for the DBC to 
establish DOD’s strategic business priorities, select and align resources to priorities and 
make outcome-driven IT investment decisions which support the Department’s business 
goals (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 2). The overall goal for the DOD is a state where: 
business and investment decisions are with the appropriate amount of information, mission 
proprietaries are aligned, and that produces a positive Return on Investment (ROI) 
(Department of Defense, 2013, p. 11). Primary components of the IBF are further discussed 
below: 
1. Enterprise Guidance 
According to the DOD SMP, the DOD’s business processes are intricately 
interrelated to the realization of the President’s mission for the National Security Strategy 
(NSS). The IBF begins with aligning the NSS, the President’s Defense Strategic Guidance 
(DSG), and other enterprise-wide strategic documents such as the Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR), and the SMP/ASP to push the expansion and implementation of functional 
strategies that meet or exceed the DOD’s business goals (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 













Source: Department of Defense (2013, p. 10) 
 
2. Functional Strategies 
The functional strategies developed by the Secretary’s PSAs align with the SMP/
ASP and address its goals, initiatives, and performance measures to assess progress against 
expected outcomes for each functional area.   
Functional strategies provide guidance to the Pre-Certification Authorities 
(PCAs) of the Components, who manage and request certification for their 
portfolios. They also provide key pieces of tactical direction to influence 
the development and management of the business systems that comprise a 
portfolio. Required elements include, but are not limited to: key initiatives; 
performance measures; and targets and projected outcomes achieved to 
date, presented as a percentage of target completeness. (Department of 
Defense, 2014, p. 3) 
3. Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) 
As required by Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222, the DCMO is responsible for developing 
and maintaining a BEA (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 9). The BEA is an information 
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resource comprised of the following elements: functional business requirements; DOD-
compliant architecture products; data requirements; standards; and policies and system 
alignment data (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 3).   These elements are necessary to 
achieve DOD’s plans to transform and mature the business environment.  “Within the 
context of the business framework, the BEA integrates business objectives, such as direct 
Treasury disbursing, and compliance requirements, such as the Procurement Data 
Standard, identified in individual functional strategies. Together functional strategies and 
the BEA form much of the basis for funds certification, a key component of the IBF” 
(Department of Defense, 2014, pp. 3-4). As a critical element of the IBF, the BEA provides 
the alignment mechanism between strategic mission priorities for business operations and 
the capabilities, systems processes and standards that support the strategy (Department of 
Defense, 2014, p. 9). The BEA also “guides IT investment management to align with 
strategic business capabilities as required by the Clinger-Cohen Act, and supports OMB 
and GAO policies and strategies. The BEA supports the Department’s overarching effort 
to improve business operations” (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 9).  
According to DOD’s 2015 Congressional Report on Defense Business Operations, 
“[d]espite being in version 10.0, the data from the BEA has not generated actionable 
reporting or conclusions for management of Department of Navy (DON) business systems. 
This year’s deployment of the BEA compliance tool was not sufficiently supported, lacked 
sufficient training, failed to produce accurate reporting, and suffered from basic usability 
and access issues. With that, the DON has adopted a maturity model to improve the 
accuracy and completeness of compliance content given current constraints” (Department 
of Defense, 2015a, p. 19). The aforementioned Congressional report went on to discuss 
how DOD policy should be focused on limiting the scope of the BEA and on delivering 
actionable data. Specifically, rather than broadening the BEA’s data collection effort with 
new taxonomies and classifications akin to E2E processes, a recommended change effort 
involved an increased focus on a single, high-value aspect and the generation of accurate, 
insightful data from smaller datasets. Furthermore, this 2015 Congressional report 
emphasized that the labor cost associated with BEA compliance needs to be carefully 
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assessed in the context of the benefits BEA provides (Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 
19).   
Despite the BEA’s shortfalls discussed above, the 2015 Congressional report 
further emphasized that DOD actively uses the BEA and analysis tools for IT portfolio 
management and to identify candidates for duplication and overlap analysis, and that 
during FY2016, “the BEA will begin to add additional capabilities that include support for 
business process improvement and system investment and interoperability analysis. The 
BEA currently provides DBS information on the alignment to processes, functions, 
standards, operational activities, and system transitions with varying degrees of detail. As 
a first step, the BEA will add the ability to align DBS functions to mission lines of business 
as well as provide a sandbox review for new or proposed BEA changes” (Department of 
Defense, 2015a, p. 28). It is anticipated that these incremental improvements to the BEA 
capabilities “will enable the Department to not only improve the ability to analyze a 
portfolio for compliance and oversight but also provide organizations the ability to search 
the business architecture for existing enterprise systems and functions, standards, 
interfaces, and overall business process improvements” (Department of Defense, 2015a, p. 
28). 
4. Organizational Execution Plans  
OEPs are then developed by Components to describe how they will execute their 
respective business strategies. OEPs show how a Component selects its portfolio of IT 
investments to align to goals and objectives captured in the SMP/ASP, functional 
strategies, and the BEA (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 4).  “OEPs also include 
certification requests presented to the DBC as portfolios of systems. Aligning business 
systems to the BEA allows the DBC to evaluate each Component’s portfolio from a multi-
dimensional perspective e.g., by Component, functional area or E2E process. The DBC 
reviews investments by OEP in a systematic manner through a four (4) filtered analysis of 
utility, strategic alignment, cost and compliance with legislation and regulations prior to 
certification” (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 4). 
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D. ENTERPRISE TRANSITION PLAN  
The ETP describes the target DOD business systems computing environment 
(otherwise known as the target environment) and is developed by the Office of the DCMO 
in close coordination with the DBC. This transition plan covers various DBS programs, 
supporting infrastructure (networks, information assurance, communications, etc.) and all 
applicable resources, all of which the DOD uses to direct and manage the principle business 
processes. The ETP identifies the set of blueprints and decisions to transition to the target 
environment and monitors transition progress (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 10).   
In its 2014 report to Congress, DOD emphasized how the ETP has evolved from a 
voluminous paper-based plan addressing ninety-three (93) covered DBS in FY 2007 to a 
robust business intelligence tool providing interactive research capability for over one 
thousand one hundred (1,100) systems; and that newer iterations of the ETP act as a single 
point of access for obtaining comprehensive data on the business systems environment 
(Department of Defense, 2014, p. 10).   
The aforementioned 2014 Congressional report further touted the following ETP 
functionality improvements: how users across the enterprise can now use the ETP to 
generate data visualizations and reports using dynamic queries; that the integrated ETP 
utilizes the same business intelligence analytics broker and data obtained for the FY 2014 
certification process; that users have the ability to sort responses to queries by Component, 
cycle (primary, out-of-cycle or combined), business function or transition state (core or 
legacy); and how the enhanced ETP charts and analytics visualizations of complex data 
provide important information for stakeholders, DOD business leaders and governance 
bodies, and enable them to answer critical questions to make informed decisions about the 
business mission area (Department of Defense, 2014, pp. 10–11). 
E.  BUSINESS SYSTEMS INVESTMENT CERTIFICATION  
According to the Defense Business Council the DOD budgets over $7 billion per 
year for business system investments (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web 
page, “Governance,” n.d.). The DBC assumes the role of the DOD’s Investment Review 
Board (IRB) for business systems to ensure that DOD’s investment management process 
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is aligned to strategies, as well as working toward the modernization and elimination of 
legacy systems and permit interoperability (Defense Business Council, n.d.). Guidance to 
implement the review process is updated annually with a focus of business system 
investments being balanced in order to obtain cost savings that can then be redirected 
towards meeting current and future needs of the warfighter and overall mission (Defense 
Business Council, n.d.). 
The business system investments within DOD are organized by portfolios, which 
are based on the component as shown in Figure 7 (the Other Defense Organizations 
(ODOs) portfolio consists of Defense Agencies and Field Agencies) (Department of 
Defense, 2014, p. 23).   These components include the Federal Government, DON, United 
States Air Force (USAF), and ODOs.  
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Figure 7.  FY 2014 Requested vs. Approved Certifications by Component 
 
Source: Department of Defense (2014, p. 23) 
 
As shown in Figure 8, in FY 2014, funding in the amount of $6,996 million was 
requested for certification of DBS’s; with approximately ninety (90%) percent of the 
requested funding being approved. The FY 2014 Presidential Budget approved funding at 
more than eight (8%) percent over the requested budget for the acquisition functional area.  
 
 37 
Figure 8.  FY 2014 Approved Certifications vs. Budgeted Amount by 
Functional Area 
 
Source: Department of Defense (2014, p. 25) 
 
In 2015, the DOD’s overall budget investment trend for business systems decreased 
by five percent (5%), yet the total number of DBS remained relatively stagnant. 
Specifically, in 2015 DBC approved certification requests totaling $6,900 million for one 
thousand one hundred and eighty-two (1,182) business systems (Department of Defense, 
2015a, p. 4) 
F. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR DEFENSE WIDE PROCUREMENT 
CAPABILITIES (A FUNCTIONAL STRATEGY) 
As previously discussed by Section C of this chapter, there are various functional 
strategies which are developed by the Secretary’s PSAs to align with the SMP/ASP and 
address its goals, initiatives, and performance measures to assess progress against expected 
outcomes within the IBF. The most pertinent functional strategy to any discussion of the 
current procurement system environment is the Strategic Plan for Defense Wide 
Procurement Capabilities (referred to earlier as “The Plan”); version 2.1 of which was 
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published as recently as February 2016 (Department of Defense, 2016). Developed with 
DOD Senior Procurement Executives and approved by the Director, DPAP, this Strategic 
Plan establishes a five year vision for the DOD’s acquisition personnel. The Plan’s vision 
is as follows: 
In order to minimize variation in contracting and simplify the design and 
development process for the next generation of systems, the Department is 
developing common services to enable data and business rule validation, 
provide clause logic, and distribute data between contract writing systems 
and the associated accounting and logistics systems. Employing this 
modular plug and play approach simplifies system development and enables 
agencies to choose the best technical solution to their individual needs and 
business environments. (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 3) 
The Strategic Plan states that IT collaborations should allow Components to 
provide all required services and supplies which are necessary for the DOD’s mission. 
These services and supplies are delivered through “innovative policy, guidance, and 
oversight while being good stewards of the taxpayers’ money” (Department of Defense, 
2016, p. 3). The DOD’s intent for this approach is to utilize enterprise wide services and 
standards to establish and encourage uniform interpretation of guidance, policy, and 
legislation. The purpose of this intent is to reduce unnecessary investment and allow for 
the prompt implementation of policy and process change that allows unique procedures 
and requirements.    
The Plan outlines a desire for the IT environment associated with DOD CWSs to 
meet defense-wide procurement capabilities, utilize common test criteria for validation and 
abide by electronic exchange data standards. Of upmost importance within The Plan is the 
“seamless use of data from authoritative sources”; therefore, “business intelligence and 
scorecards” are utilized to monitor and certify advancement and notify DOD’s governing 
bodies of existing and future systems environment (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 3).   
A COTS CWS is not currently available to meet the DOD’s requirements. It is the 
intent of the DOD to develop an operating system that adheres to data standards that govern 
the core capabilities and business rules that allow Components to integrate commercial 
applications as well as develop unique capabilities based on specific business needs 
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(Department of Defense, 2016, p. 4). Key components of The Plan are further discussed 
below: 
1. Contract Writing Systems Statutory Direction  
Defense contracting is governed primarily by the FAR, DFARS (and associated 
supplements), along with DOD directives, and DOD instructions (Department of Defense, 
2016, p. 8). As a result of regulation changes, defense contracting continues to experience 
changes with type change response cycles being eighteen (18) months or less. In order 
accommodate the changing regulations and policies, DOD CWSs would require 
functionality to enable customization in order to allow for updates due to emerging policy 
and guidance. 
 E-Government Act of 2002 
By instituting goals, the E-Government Act of 2002 mandates requirements that the 
DOD must achieve within its business systems to ensure that efficiencies are realized with 
industry partners (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 8). Since the passage of this act, the 
DOD has improved transparency with regard to Government decision making by using the 
Internet to provide the general public with access to Government information (OMB, 2015, 
p. 7). 
 National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013 
As required within Section 862 of the NDAA for FY 2013, the DOD has been 
directed to: 
Establish uniform data standards, internal control requirements, 
independent verification and validation requirements, and business process 
rules for processing requests, contracts, receipts, and invoices by the 
Department of Defense or other executive agencies, as applicable; Establish 
and maintain one or more approved electronic contract writing systems that 
conform with the standards, requirements, and rules established [above], 
and; require the use of electronic contract writing systems approved in 
accordance with [the electronic contract writing systems (above)] for all 
contracts entered into by the Department of Defense or other executive 
agencies, as applicable. (Public Law 112-339, 2013) 
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Since the passage of Section 862 of the NDAA for FY 2013, the DOD has 
implemented and released the mandatory criterions and business tenets. An update of 
DOD’s progress was provided to Congress on 31 July 2013 (Department of Defense, 2016, 
p. 5).  
2. Transparency 
The Plan has provided a broader direction that addresses procedures across the 
entire procurement life cycle (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 5). According to The Plan, 
material and non-material factors within legacy DOD CWSs have impeded upon DOD’s 
ability to comply with legislative policy to make DOD contracting actions available to the 
public, however, progress is now being realized through validation and verification 
processes.  
3. Procurement Scenarios 
Because contracting occurs worldwide, there are many different environments in 
which procurement can take place, such as an office environment in which modern 
automation is available, or in a contingency contracting environment in which operation is 
conducted in austere operating conditions with limited network connectivity (Department 
of Defense, 2016, p. 5). Contracting is then further defined into communities based on what 
that command procures, however, there are instances in which organizations that do not 
typically procure a certain type of commodity / service, must assist a sister organization in 
doing so. In order to receive acquisition packages from external organizations, procurement 
systems must be in place (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 5).  
The contracting environment within the DOD is comprised of “operational/base 
level, major systems, and logistic/inventory control point” scenarios (Department of 
Defense, 2016, p. 5). The most complicating factor within these environments is the, 
“required integration with legacy, new, and emerging component systems within the 
requirements development, logistics and accounting areas in order to support the 
components requirements” (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 5).  
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 Major Weapon System Procurement 
Major weapon system procurement is supported by each branch within the DOD 
and is identified within The Plan to be the most complex contracting scenario. Because of 
the size and complexity of these contract requirements, it has been difficult to develop a 
Government contracting tool that accommodate the needs of this type of procurement 
without excessive modification (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 5). Currently Air Force’s 
Contract Writing System (ConWrite), Army’s PADDS, and the Navy’s (and other Defense 
Agencies) SPS are the contract writing systems that support major weapon system 
procurement (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 5).  
 Operational / Base Level Procurement 
This type of contracting can include a full range of contract types, products, 
services, and construction and is classified as less complex than major weapons systems 
procurement. The SPS contract writing system is most commonly used for operational / 
base level procurement (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 6). 
 Inventory Control Point Procurement 
The Plan identifies this type of contracting as the least complex contracting scenario 
in which relatively simple contract actions are executed. The workload volume for this type 
of contract action is generally high, with a great deal of integration required amongst the 
CWS and the requirements systems (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 6). Currently 
Automated Contract Preparation System (ACPS), Integrated Technical Item Management 
(ITIMP), and EProcurement are the contract writing systems that support inventory control 
point procurement (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 6). 
4. Current State of the Procurement Electronic Business Environment 
As previously mentioned, since 1995 DOD has been designated as high risk 
because of the challenges within the DOD’s business system modernization efforts. The 
procurement enterprise capabilities have automated manual processes and achieved 
efficiencies with pre and post-award contract processes; however, today there are 
seventeen (17) unclassified CWS in use within the DOD, each with shortages that do not 
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allow for long term usage without additional investment, material modification or complete 
implementation of a new system. Issues with the clause logical capabilities and legacy 
system architectures are the largest sources of issue within the DOD CWS.   
While DOD continues to employ the use of seventeen (17) different CWS, there 
have been efforts to consolidate other business systems, such as the establishment of the 
PPIRS system to become the single source of past performance information; the  
integration within the WAWF suite to include the Electronic Document Access (EDA), 
CORT, or the establishment of SAM which replaced Central Contractor Registration 
(CCR) and the On-line Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA) tools 
(Department of Defense, 2016, p. 6). 
5. Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 
“Re-engineering and readiness initiatives on DOD policy have prioritized actions 
to further develop internal controls and implemented data standardization to improve 
existing operations” (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 6). Appendix B shows a complete 
listing of the DOD procurement environment compared to the DOTMLPF framework. 
6. Enterprise Systems and Services 
“The System View (SV)-8 ‘Systems Evolution Description’ presents a whole life 
cycle view of resources (systems), describing how they change over time. It shows the 
structure of several resources mapped against a timeline. The intended usage of the SV-8 
includes: the development of incremental acquisition strategy and planning for technology 
insertion” (DoDAF Architecting, n.d.). The SV-8 architecture is mainly funded at the DOD 
level. The role of enterprise systems and services is shown in Figure 9. The goal when 
developing new information systems is to reduce duplicate actions and increase 
compatibility with other systems within the network, but also to acknowledge and allow 
for unique procedures and interoperability constraints (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 
31). 
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Figure 9.  Use of Enterprise Services in Contract Writing Data Flow 
 
Source: Department of Defense (2016, p. 31) 
 
DOD CWSs must be able to accept Purchase Request Data Standard (PRDS), 
import existing contract documents from Electronic Document Access (EDA) website and 
then import the specific contractor data from SAM, use the PRDS/PDS validation service 
at the Global Exchange Service (GEX), obtain provisions and clauses from the clause logic 
service, import wage determinations from the Wage Determinations On-Line service, 
validate modifications prior to award using EDA and GEX PDS validation service, then 
distribute contracts as PDS and Portable Document Format (PDF) documents, and, finally 
be able to report contract actions to FPDS-NG (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 31). 
Further information about the required capabilities for each of the aforementioned systems 
or services can be found within Appendix C.  
The following capabilities are not currently provided at the enterprise level:  
1. User interface for drafting documents 
2. Document workflow  
3. Records management of internal documents 
4. Solicitation posting 
5. Proposal receipt 
6. Source selection tools 
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7. Cost analysis tools 
In the future, functionalities such as solicitation posting, proposal receipt, and cost 
analysis tools could become incorporated in to enterprise services (Department of Defense, 
2016, p. 31).  
7. Data Standards for CWSs 
There are two (2) sets of data standards in use in DOD contracting- PDS) and PRDS 
(Department of Defense, 2016, p. 35) . As described in “The Plan,” all DOD CWSs are 
required to adhere with the interface enterprise systems as well as the prescribed use of 
data.   
PDS data is made up of data from American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
X12 850 and 860 transactions, plus any data that may be required to recreate the contract 
documentation. Within the DOD, all future CWSs are anticipated to be compatible with 
currents PDS and to undergo regular updates (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 35). 
PRDS contains the data within the purchase request (PR) which is required to 
support contract writing. Any system that creates a PR should be compatible with the PRDS 
when transmitting to external CWSs (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 35). 
G. FUTURE GOALS 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was established as a means 
to improve performance management and requires that all agencies engage in performance 
management tasks (Public Law 13-62, 1993). In order to be compliant with the GPRA, 
each agency must submit both strategic and performance plans, as well as, conducting a 
gap analysis of various agency elements. The strategic plan is to cover a five (5) year span 
that must contain the agencies mission statement and long term goals for each major 
component of the agency. The intent of the performance plan is to establish goals by fiscal 
year, as well as, how each goal will be accomplished and how each goal can be certified as 
complete. The annual progress reports are meant to detail both successes and failures in 
accomplishing identified performance goals.   
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On 4 January 2011, President Obama signed H.R. 2142 (GPRA Modernization Act 
of 2010 or GPRAMA) as Public Law 111-352 Section 10 which added the further 
requirement that agencies must publish their plans and reports in a machine-readable 
format (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 2015). This Act also requires agencies to 
develop priority goals as required under Section 1120(b) of Title 31 U.S.C and that this 
information will be merged with the existing data required by Section 112 of Title 31 
U.S.C. This updated Act further fits into the overall modernization goal that GAO has been 
reporting on the DOD since 1995.  
As stated in the Strategic Plan for Defense Wide Procurement Capabilities (A 
Functional Strategy) Version 2.1, the DOD has laid out various objectives and initiatives 
for FY 2016 through FY 2018 as a roadmap for the modernization effort broken down by 
the overall goal (Protecting the Future and Improving Efficiency). These goals encompass 
both enterprise systems and component systems, as well as, touching on many of the 
various elements of contract writing from clause logic to Product Service Codes. In order 
to improve overall efficiency, the DOD has laid out thirteen (13) different initiatives 
(Department of Defense, 2016). Table 3 details each of these initiatives, the applicable 
policy, overall objective, and policy target:  
Table 3.   FY 14 – FY 15 Accomplishments Improving Efficiency  






implementation and integration of 
clause logic service. Mature 
scorecards and validation 




financial management  
electronic exchanges 
across the Procure to 




Publish with the Comptroller  
procedures to address financial 
and procurement transactions 
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Initiative Policy Objective 
Standardize processes 
and procedures for  
Intragovernmental 
Transactions 
FAR 17.5,  
DFARS 217.5, 208.70,  
DODI 4000.19. 
Continue to pilot electronic direct  
cite Military Intradepartmental 
Purchase Requests (MIPRs) 
capability using PR data standard 
in WAWF. Support Navy pilot 
with (In-Service Procurement 





across the transaction 
P2P life cycle to 
support GFP E2E 
FAR 52.245-1, DFARS 
252.245-7001  
through 7004  
and 252–245-7007 
Conduct outreach, training to 
ensure workforce understands 
ability to track Warranty E2E and 
Government Furnished Property 
(GFP), GFP scorecards issued 
quarterly 
Establish enterprise 
capability to track 
appointment and 




DODI issued, DFARS  
PGI 201.602-2 
Complete deployment of DOD 
wide  
COR tool as a module in WAWF; 




financial management  
electronic exchanges 
across the P2P 
transactions 
Numerous References 
Measure the effectiveness of  
procedures (metrics) pertaining to 
data sharing across functional 
areas. 
Improve collection of 
vendor data (including 
annual  
representations) 
FAR 4.11, 4.12, 
DFARS  
204.11, 204.12, 204.71 
DOD to ensure sponsorship for  
several proposals for the System 
for Award Management [managed 
by General Services 
Administration (GSA)] to 
improve vendor management. 
Implementation will occur in 
FY16/17 
Develop and enterprise 
capability to notify 
DOD  
regarding physically 
complete and closed 
contracts 
FAR 4.8, DFARS 
204.804 
Refine policy needed to ensure an  
enterprise capability. Automate 
contract closeout where feasible 
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Initiative Policy Objective 
Virtual File 
Management/ 
Electronic File Folder 
DFARS 204.802 
Enable enterprise view of contract  
status; establish official contract 
file rules to eliminate 
requirements for paper copies, 
avoid redundancy, and use 
enterprise resources. 
Improve the 
management of high 
risk procurement 
FAR 9.1 and 9.2, 
DFARS 209.1 and 
209.2, FAR 13.106, 
FAR 15.304, FAR 
42.15 and DFARS 
215.304 
Develop and deploy increment 2  
of PPIRS-SR to improve quality 
and usability of data on contractor 
performance to improve source 
selections especially simplified 
acquisitions.  
Clarify rules for 
DoDAAC use Numerous References 
Clarify use of Department of 
Defense Activity Address Codes 
(DODAACs) for DATA Act  
Implementation; ensure use of 
procurement hierarchy in 
Department of Defense Activity 
Address Directory (DoDAAD) 





Develop and implement DFARS 
policy for Contract Deficiency 
Reports (CDRs) to improve 








Pending regulatory  
coverage 
With Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness 
[USD (P&R)] achieve efficiencies  
for ECMRA reporting 
Source: (Department of Defense, 2016, p. 16) 
 
To address potential future issues and protect the systems down the road, the DOD 
identified fourteen (14) different initiatives each with its own objective, as further detailed 




Table 4.   FY 14 – FY 15 Accomplishments Protecting the Future  
Initiative Policy Objective 
Determine a Business  
Intelligence method to 
measure the Health of 
Contracting Offices 
N/A Develop and deliver V3.0 
Establish and implement 




Implement PRDS across DOD;  





FAR 2012–203 final,  
DFARS 2015-D011 
pending final rule 
DFARS policy will establish DOD  
implementation data. 
Implementation underway. 
Standardize line item  
contracting for the 
federal government 
FAR case pending 
final  
rule publication 
FAR case published for public  
comment under adjudication. 
Establish an Product 
Service Code (PSC) to 






signed March 15 
Establish governance for codes,  
code crosswalk, and tool 
maintenance. 





through 7004 and 
252.245-7007 
Develop and E2E roadmap to guide  
implementation 
Establish ability to  
efficiently determine 
vendor corporate family 
tree structure 
FAR/DFARS 
Implementation of corporate family  
tree underway, completion targeted 
for FY 2016 
Improve ability to 
measure compliance and 
DOD contracting trends 
N/A 
DOD will define and develop 
reports  
to enable transparency and P2P 
execution and traceability. 
Develop an effective  
efficient method to 
present buying 




Redesign EMALL to enable a  
government wide automated 
process for selecting sources and 
managing award for common 
commercial products and services, 
and stock numbered items. 
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Initiative Policy Objective 
Determine requirements 




Develop ability to store warrants  
in EDA. Army has developed a 
capability to manage, issue, and 
track warrants. The procurement 
community will assess this 





DOD procurement community is  
assessing the need to develop and 
implement a BPM environment to 
fill gaps between commercial tools 
and DOD requirements as an 
enterprise capability. 
Contract Line Item 
Number (CLIN) Service 
To Be Determined 
(TBD) 
Explore methods to enable better  
compliance with the Uniform 
Contract Format 
Vendor Portal for  
Solicitation TBD 
DOD will explore possibility of an  
enterprise service to enable 
solicitation management.  
Determine common role  
designators for access to 
procurement systems. 
N/A 
Determine approach to an 
enterprise  
service to enable common role 
designators for access to 
procurement systems.  
Source: Department of Defense (2016, p. 18) 
 
As required by Title 10 U.S.C. §2222, the Secretary of Defense submits an annual 
report on DOD compliance to the congressional defense committees covering Defense 
Business Operations. From FY 2014–2015, the department continued to track progress of 
system certification based on the individual systems which have financial investments 
specifically for development and modernization that exceed $250,000 (Department of 
Defense, 2015a). By 2015, Mr. David Tillotson III stated that Defense Business Council 
certified 1,182 systems that accounted for $6.9 billion in investments (Department of 
Defense, 2015a). It was noted that of the $6.9 billion, $1.7 billion was specifically for 
Development/Modernization and that the DOD had retired multiple legacy systems 
through this process. The DOD reported that fifteen (15) or roughly sixteen (16%) percent 
 50 
of systems with a certification request exceeding $250,000 all have a positive ROI. The 
DOD plans on focusing on the other seventy-seven (77) systems (all of which have a 
greater than $250,000 in Development and Modernization funds) which have yet to 
experience positive ROI or systems that have not been reported on.   
The DOD’s Management Strategy is one that provides a “disciplined approach to 
providing leadership with a linkage between performance management and resourcing 
decisions through strategy, planning, monitoring, and reporting; and manages progress 
toward achieving improvements” (Department of Defense, 2015a). In this strategy, the 
DOD identified multiple tactics which include incorporating the high risk areas identified 
by the GAO, complying with NDAA and GPRAMA, ensuring other statutory compliance, 
collecting and analyzing metrics, and providing real time data on cost and performance. 
Figure 10 details how each area transitions into the next and identifies each of the major 
stakeholders: 
Figure 10.  DOD’s Management Strategy 
 
Source: Department of Defense (2015b, p. 38) 
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H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined various aspects of DOD’s organizational structure, 
stakeholder engagement, and strategic alignment as it pertains to necessary improvements 
to its business operations. This chapter also included an in-depth discussion of DOD’s 
strategic plan for defense wide procurement capabilities with particular emphasis on its 
CWSs. The intent of which has been to provide a greater understanding of the overall 
structure in which DOD operates within to implement new strategies and corrective actions 
in order to establish the proper context for the analysis and recommendations regarding 
DOD’s business systems modernization efforts that are subsequently included herein. The 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The DOD business systems environment is incredibly complex. The intent of this 
chapter is to provide a more focused discussion of CWSs being utilized by the researchers 
to better enable the identification of specific improvement areas. Currently, there are 
approximately seventeen (17) unclassified CWS in the DOD (Department of Defense, 
2016). The authors have direct work experience with the following CWSs: SPS, SeaPort-
e, and PADDS. This chapter will provide a brief history, key functionalities, and problems/
issues for each of the aforementioned CWSs. The case studies developed in this chapter 
will be utilized to present an in depth analysis, as well as recommendations for improving 
DOD’s business system modernization efforts in Chapters V and VI respectively.   
B. STANDARD PROCUREMENT SYSTEM (SPS) 
1. Background 
According to a 2002 GAO report that provided testimony from the Managing 
Director for Information Technology Issues, Joel C. Willemssen, the SPS program was 
established in November 1994 by the Office of the Director of Defense Procurement to 
serve as the foundation for DOD’s multi-billion dollar business systems modernization 
efforts with the intention of consolidating all of DOD’s contract management functions 
into a single enterprise-wide platform (GAO-02-392T, 2002). The testimony provided by 
the aforementioned GAO report went on to detail DOD’s initial expectation that SPS would 
dramatically improve the efficiency and effectiveness with which the Department procured 
and administered contracts by replacing seventy-six (76) CWSs that existed at that time 
(GAO-02-392T, 2002). This testimony also provided information regarding SPS 
requirements development that occurred between 1994 and 1996, ultimately resulting in 
the award of a commercially procured contract to American Management Systems (AMS) 
in April 1997 with the direction that system functionalities be provided through a series of 
planned incremental releases (GAO-02-392T, 2002).   
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The implementation of SPS encountered a myriad of challenges that were identified 
by GAO and DODIG. Even by 2002, the aforementioned testimony highlighted the fact 
that “[o]nly two (2) legacy systems had been fully retired and two (2) partially retired, and 
DOD did not know what, if any, associated cost savings had resulted” (GAO-02-392T, 
2002). This testimony went on to emphasize many other commitments DOD had made for 
the SPS program, but which the Department had failed to achieve.   
While the DOD has responded to many of these SPS-related issues over the years, 
the CWS continues to run into obstacles that prohibit the system from achieving DOD’s 
lofty initial goals and objectives. In acknowledgement of many of SPS’ shortfalls, then 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Frank Kendall III, 
issued a memorandum 25 September 2014 that extended his previously established sunset 
date for SPS of 30 September 2015 to 30 September 2018 (USD AT&L Memorandum, 
2014). The aforementioned memorandum provided the following: the DOD’s objective is 
to migrate completely from SPS by 30 September 2020, this allows for contracts to be 
awarded through 18 September 2018 and administered through the cut-off date. By 
establishing these cut-off-dates it enforces that each Component should prioritize, budget, 
and plan for any future contracting needs (USD AT&L Memorandum, 2014). 
Currently, the authors are observing the separate efforts of the Navy and the Army 
to replace the now over 20-year-old SPS CWS. Even though the authors have observed 
progress being made by the Navy and Army, there are still a number of obstacles and risks 
that need to be proactively considered and mitigated. All Departments moving forward 
with CWS development should take a closer look at challenges DOD faced with the 
implementation of SPS, and use those lessons learned as a way to mitigate future risks 
associated with a major CWS procurement.  
2. Functionalities 
Given the forthcoming sunset of SPS, the authors will place less emphasis on the 
system’s functionalities. Instead, a general summary of SPS’ functionalities will be 
provided as a means to highlight basic considerations for future CWSs. More emphasis 
will be placed on the functionalities of SeaPort-e and PADDS later in this chapter. 
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CACI International, Inc., a private-sector company that currently owns the data 
rights to SPS, deploys the CWS through its Procurement Desktop-Defense (PD2) 
application, and has published a brochure highlighting the functionalities of the PD2 v4.2.2 
platform, some of which are included below (CACI International, Inc., 2016): 
a. Requirements definition through PR forms, supporting documentation using 
forms and templates, and incorporation of technical information and specific 
clauses – The researcher notes the PR functionality is not consistently utilized 
at the Component level due to a myriad of Legacy systems which perform that 
capability. 
b. At the CLIN level the contract type, quantity, product/service description, 
cost, and delivery information is captured. This information is also captured at 
the sub-Contract Line Item Number (SLIN) level, or Exhibit Line Item 
Number (ELIN) level – The researcher notes the functionality of line items at 
the sub-CLIN and ELIN levels is rather sub-optimal, and often conflicts with 
data standards (e.g., format/structure of lines of accounting) from Legacy 
financial systems. 
c. Development of all standard solicitation and award documents through 
integration into a Microsoft Word document – The researcher notes the 
Microsoft Word version within SPS often conflicts with more current versions 
on the user’s desktop, and users do not have sufficient ability to customize the 
system-generated documents to appear in a more professional manner. 
d. Clause logic systematically selects appropriate contract terms and conditions 
via pre-selected parameters – The researcher notes that the clause selection 
logic is not intuitive enough, often results in duplicative or unnecessary 
clauses, or other discrepancies such as clauses being marked as read-only 
which actually require fill-in data (and vice versa).  
e. Evaluation of sole-source and competitively obtained price proposals – The 
researcher notes this capability is not consistently utilized at the Component 
level. 
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f. Maintains the conformed contract document – The researcher notes this 
functionality is significantly sub-optimal. 
g. Supports “concurrent modifications” – The researcher notes numerous 
problems have been incurred with this claimed capability. 
h. Contract closeout on DD1597 and DD1594 – The researcher notes that 
contract closeout procedures in SPS often requires manual data entry in 
separate financial-related Legacy systems. 
i. Contract Action Report (CARs) which sends data directly to the FPDS-NG 
website. 
j. Contractor-provided SPS service and support – The researcher notes that 
many of the Contractor’s claimed support services are rarely utilized at the 
Component level, and that Components expend additional resources of their 
own to address SPS-related issues. 
C. SEAPORT-E 
1. Background 
As stated on the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) website, “SeaPort-e is 
the Navy’s electronic platform for acquiring support services in twenty-two (22) functional 
areas including Engineering, Financial Management, and Program Management” (Naval 
Sea Systems Command, n.d.). SeaPort-e is utilized by NAVSEA, Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and 
the United States Marine Corps (USMC) compete their service requirements amongst 
2.400+ SeaPort-e Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) Multiple Award Contract 
(MAC) holders. This online portal provides an efficient and standardized means of 
communicating, advertising, and requesting proposals from pre-approved industry 
partners. Task orders issued through the portal are awarded on a competitive basis and are 
administered using the platform. This online portal is paramount in engaging & meeting 
small business goals since almost eighty-five (85%) of approved industry partners are 
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Small Business Administration (SBA) verified small businesses. In order to submit a 
proposal as a prime in this portal, a company must enroll through the annual rolling 
admissions which allows new industry partners  
NAVSEA procures over a half billion dollars of Professional Support Services 
(PSS) each year for its headquarters’ Directorates, Program Executive Offices (PEOs), and 
field activities. The SeaPort-e Office was established in at Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren Division (NSWC-DD) to bring organization to the acquisition of PSS and to meet 
the OSD performance based contracting directive. NAVSEA’s vision for this portal was to 
provide “a faster, better, and cheaper means in which to procure PSS” (Naval Sea Systems 
Command, n.d.).  
As stated on the NAVSEA SeaPort-e website:  
The strategy developed in October 2000 involved a product line solution 
containing three components:  (1) Develop and award Multiple Award IDIQ 
contracts (MACs) using innovative acquisition techniques to achieve the 
NAVSEA strategic wedge, to conform to the OSD performance based 
contracting directive, and to bring order to PSS acquisitions.  (2) Exploit 
existing e-business opportunities and create an automated, intuitive, web-
based, e-procurement portal to provide services quickly and easily in an 
“amazon.com” environment. (3) Create a website continually refreshing 
customers and suppliers with new information, opportunities, training, 
metrics and useful links to associate sites. (Naval Sea Systems Command, 
n.d.) 
In less than six (6) months, all three of these components merged and the portal was 
launched on 02 April 2001.  
2. Functionalities 
The portal consists of two (2) sides:  The Proposal System and the TOMS. Each 
side feeds into a milestone function calculator which will send automated emails to the 
Contract Specialist should an agreed upon milestone is missed. Below details various 
functionalities of the SeaPort-e Portal.  
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a. Proposal System: 
1. Online competition portal: Vendors submit proposals via the online portal 
exclusively. The Contract Specialist is able to download all proposals and 
applicable documents via the portal. Only subcontractors are allowed to 
submit un-sanitized proposals only directly to the Contract Specialist in order 
to protect proprietary information, if the subcontractor does not have a 
SeaPort-e account. Subcontractors can also upload via the portal and password 
protect proposal documents while emailing the Contract Specialist the 
applicable password. This exception is detailed in Section L of the 
solicitation.  
2. Search Capability: On the proposal side you can search by Event Name, 
Description, Status (Current, Past, Future, Cancelled, Incomplete, 
Superseded), Category (various MACs in the Gov), Sub-Category 
[Solicitation, Request for Information (RFI), Draft Status, etc.], Zone, and Set-
Aside Status. You can also search by Teaming Arrangements. This allows you 
to pull similar solicitations, advanced notices, and industry day 
announcements as part of the Market Research process.  
3. Announcements:  Industry Day/Advanced Notices:  The Government can 
upload Draft Section C, Labor Qualifications, and estimated Level-of-Effort 
for vendors to ask questions about via the portal. The Government can let the 
industry partners know when the industry day is and other applicable 
information (estimated milestones, etc.).    
4. Question & Answers:  After the solicitation or Announcement is released, 
Primes can submit questions via the portal; the Government gets a notification 
and then can craft the appropriate answer which is also visible to all potential 
offerors Question and Answers are open to every company, not just the one 
answering the question. However, source selection integrity is intact, vendors 
cannot see who submitted the Question.  
5. Annual rolling admissions: Primes can submit proposals to be accepted into 
the program, by applying vendors agree to many of the required Clauses and 
 59 
Provisions first before submitting their first proposal. Vendors also have to 
propose caps on fee, pass-thru, and escalation.   
6. Zones:  The U.S. is broken down by zones and then further broken down by 
SBA classifications. If you want the prime to be in your area and an 8(a), you 
pick your zone and then can send the notice to just 8(a) Primes located within 
your zone.   Or you can select all companies in the zone and further push for 
competition by allowing every company to know what just hit the street.  
7. Number of proposals:  When a solicitation closes, each vendor is shown how 
many proposals were submitted in response.   
8. Source Selection:  After the Source Selection Team has provided the required 
documents/training, they can register for SeaPort-e access if they do not have 
it already. The Contracting Officer and Contract Specialist have the ability to 
choose what documents in the portal the team has access to, ensuring the 
source selection team does not have access to cost related information.   
b. Seaport TOMS: 
 
1. Online Files:  Both the COR and Contract Specialists have electronic files 
located in each task order where required documents can be uploaded and 
saved electronically.   
2. Funding:  When money is approved by Comptroller, it is automatically 
imported into the portal. SeaPort-e imports the Line of Accounting (LOA), 
Cost Center, and other applicable information from ERP (see below). The 
only time the LOA is hand typed is on the initial award (except for one-bids). 
Since Task Order Number has to be identified when creating a PR, this 
information is not supplied until after the award is released when competition 
is released in order to ensure procurement integrity and source selection 
information. When this information is omitted, it cannot be imported into the 
right task order electronic file. Within the Section G Section of the system, 
there is a drop down menu in Seaport showing all PR’s that have been 
approved.   
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3. Other Systems  – ERP:  ERP is our main electronic system, this software 
handles financials, training, timecards, etc. SeaPort-e is linked to ERP, when a 
piece of funding is obligated on a mod, you check ERP to ensure the 
obligation was accepted by ERP (90% of the time it does).   
4. Cost Realism:  SeaPort-e has a search function where you can search by users 
mailbox, package status, activity, contractor, negotiator, Bilateral Task Order 
Status, document number, command, keyword, COR, or contract vehicle. If 
additional information is needed, the Contract Specialist can use this feature to 
assist in the cost realism process. However, this assumes the Contract 
Specialist’s files are up to date – some commands do not enforce the 
utilization of this functionality.   
5. Reporting:  SeaPort-e can generate the following reports:  Executed Task 
Orders, Option Expiration, Package Status, Small Business, Small Business 
Subcontracting, Solicitation, Task Order Award, Task Order Cumulative 
Status, Task Order, Modification Procurement Administration Lead Time 
(PALT), TimeStamp, and TimeStamp Per Package.  
D. PROCUREMENT AUTOMATED DATA AND DOCUMENT SYSTEM  
1. Background 
The PADDS is used by Army Materiel Command (AMC) at six (6) Major 
Subordinate Command / Life Cycle Management Commands (MSC/LCMCs) (LeGros, 
2008). PADDS provides a standardized method that is used in the preparation, recording, 
processing, and maintaining of contractual instruments—whether administered in-house or 
assigned to another DOD contract administration service (CAS) component for 
administration (Site Purpose, n.d.). The purpose of PADDS is to provide a means of 
producing signature-ready solicitation and award documents with minimal manual input 
(CSC- St. Louis, 2013).  
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2. Functionalities 
As indicated in the PADDS User’s Manual, PADDS is able to execute the following 
interface functions: 
a. Interface with funding data contained within the Logistics Modernization 
Program (LMP) program with minimal manual input. 
b. Automatically connect to FPDS-NG website to complete the required CAR. 
c. New PRs are built into PADDS from the Defense Automated Procurement 
Request System (DAPRS) or LMP interface once the PR is released for 
processing.  
d. Automatically generate a PDF version of the contract/modification to be 
posted at the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). 
e. Automatically generate EDI transaction sets for the contract/modification for 
Mechanization of Contract Administration Systems (MOCAS).   
f. Ability to automatically post solicitations and amendments to the FedBizOpps 
website. 
Although there are many functions within the PADDS CWS it is the researcher’s 
opinion that the current functionality offered by PADDS is not enough. The antiquated 
system is often undependable, experiencing frequent outages due to required repairs and 
does not reflect the vision set forth by the GAO. The researcher of this JAP that exclusively 
uses the PADDS CWS finds the below listed functionalities to be the most beneficial when 
executing duties as a Contract Specialist.   
(1) Computation of regulatory and instrument clauses for solicitation and contract 
documents which are required by the FAR, DFARS, Department of the Army (DA), AMC, 
and local levels based on general criteria such as type of instrument, anticipated dollar 
value, kind and type of contract, and whether or not the acquisition is competitive. 
(2) Ability for the user to change, add to, or delete clauses from the list computed 
for a specific instrument. 
(3) Entry and maintenance of user supplied narratives at the instrument and line 
item level. 
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(4) Creation of contract lines, sub lines and exhibit lines in accordance with the 
DFARS. 
 (5) Processing of delivery schedule dates entered as either a firm or estimated date, 
number of days after award or as required. 
 (6) Calculation and validation of total line item quantities and dollar amounts and 
the total amount of the award or modification. 
 (7) Automatic accumulation of obligated dollar amounts by Accounting 
Classification Reference Number (ACRN). 
(8) Capability to concurrently process multiple open modifications or amendments 
against the same instrument. 
 (9) Generation of appropriate standard and DOD procurement forms [Standard 
Form (SF) 18, SF 26, SF 33, SF 1449, and DD Form 1155] applicable to the solicitation or 
award instrument. All documents conform to the uniform contract format (UCF) specified 
by the DFARS and include completed table of contents entries and pagination (current page 
and of page values resolved). 
 (10) Generation of a contract distribution list with the award document when 
requested. 
(11) Generation of an errata sheet with all solicitation and award documents. The 
errata sheet identifies regulatory clauses that were changed, added to, or deleted from the 
acquisition instrument. 
(12) Standard Form 279. A Contract Action Report (CAR) will be generated for all 
contract, order and modification actions. A CAR will be generated for no dollar basic ID/
IQ, basic ordering agreements (BOA) and basic purchase agreements (BPA). Upon 
validation of a contractual instrument requiring a CAR, PADDS will link to the Federal 
Procurement Data System website to initiate the creation of a CAR. Multiple CARs may 
be generated if the action includes Recovery Act funding, foreign military sales (FMS) and 
non-FMS requirements. 
 (13) Processing of multiple user organizations on one database and machine. 
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(14) The automatic updating of the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) 
database as a by-product of the award process. 
 (15) Contract award documents, which are signed in PADDS, are loaded to the 
Electronic Document Access (EDA) website. 
(16) PADDS has an automated method to track actions issued through EDI or 
actions exempt from EDI (depicted by head of contracting agency (HCA) class exemption 
or Contracting Officer determination). PADDS releases EDI transactions to vendor(s), 
public, or multiple commercial and government entity (CAGE) codes. 
 (17) PADDS contracts/modifications procurement documents are transmitted by 
EDI (transaction sets 850 and 860) to the MOCAS. 
(18) PADDS has the ability to automatically forward synopsis of award to the 
Federal Business Opportunity website for contract awards greater than $25,000. 
(19) PADDS provides the ability to generate a Pre-solicitation Synopsis and post 
the synopsis to the Federal Business Opportunity website. 
 (20) The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 requires the 
capability to issue solicitations, receive and evaluate responses, and award purchases 
through the ANSI X.12 transaction sets. PADDS is capable of processing through the ANSI 
X.12 transaction sets. 
(21) PADDS has the capability to allow the generation of Automated Delivery 
Orders (ADOs) against Indefinite Delivery Contracts (IDCs) based upon specific criteria 
which is established on the IDC. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed some of the primary functionalities of each of the three (3) 
CWSs used by the authors of this JAP. In addition, this chapter also provided an assessment 
of the most beneficial parts of each of the referenced three (3) CWS, based on each of the 
authors’ experiences. The intent of this chapter was to provide a focused discussion of three 
(3) CWSs currently being utilized within DOD so that specific improvement areas could 
be better identified. The functionalities of the CWSs which were highlighted in this chapter 
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serve as examples of the potential shortfalls, redundancies, capabilities, and best practices 
that should be thoroughly considered by DOD leadership. The next chapter will apply an 
analytical framework to better address problems pertaining to DOD’s business system 





This chapter applies an analytical framework to better address problems pertaining 
to DOD’s business system modernization efforts, and includes an evaluation of three (3) 
potential CWS alternatives. The intent for this chapter is to analyze the information 
previously presented herein for the purposes of determining potential root causes which 
are inhibiting successful modernization efforts. This discussion will provide the foundation 
for the authors’ recommendations which will be presented in Chapter VI.   
B. THREE INTEGRATIVE PILLARS OF SUCCESS© ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
The TIPS© consisting of personnel, platforms, and protocols were initially 
developed by E. C. Yoder in 2010 to provide “an assessment and management tool for 
planning and executing contingency contracting operations” (Yoder, 2014). The essential 
premise was that, “[w]ithout all three pillars working in harmony, the contracting, 
planning, and associated support provided to the warfighter will be sub-optimized. Sub-
optimization will result in lost efficiencies and effectiveness and, at worst, may act to 
subvert the COCOM objectives” (Yoder, 2010, p. 42). TIPS© was modified in 2013 to 
address the important distinction that the three (3) primary pillars of personnel, platforms, 
and protocols require a requisite foundation of authorization and appropriation, and that 
together all four (4) elements are required to be mature in order to support a successful 
organization (Yoder, 2014). The TIPS© analytical framework is illustrated by Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Three Integrative Pillars of Success© (TIPS©) 
Source: Yoder (2014, p. 16) 
While the TIPS© analytical framework was initially developed as an assessment 
and management tool for contingency contracting operations, the authors have determined 
it to be incredibly suitable for analyzing the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD’s CWSs. 
Doing so provides a systematic approach to addressing the myriad of complex issues 
presented earlier. Accordingly, the following discussion applies the TIPS© analytical 
framework to DOD’s CWS environment to help determine if there are any sub-
optimizations or maturity gaps that need to be overcome. Each TIPS© element will be 
defined and discussed separately to provide a more focused assessment. Following the 
discussion of each individual TIPS© element, the authors will provide an overall 
assessment regarding whether or not DOD’s current utilization of its CWSs truly optimize 
the accomplishment of its mission objectives. 
1. TIPS© – Authorization and Appropriation
The TIPS© foundation of authorization and appropriation emphasizes that “nothing 
gets accomplished without the funds to structure and execute pillars” (Yoder, 2014, p. 20). 
Chapter II discussed the extensive legislative authorities pertaining to the use of funds in 
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support of DOD’s business systems modernization efforts, and Chapter III provided detail 
regarding how those legislative authorities have shaped the structure in which DOD 
operates within to implement new strategies and corrective actions. Examples of legislation 
which have significantly impacted DOD’s business systems modernization efforts are 
listed below for further emphasis: 
a. The Clinger-Cohen Act – This act was enacted in 1996 to improve how the 
Federal Government procures and disposes of IT hardware. The act required 
the DOD to appoint a CIO with delegated authority to ensure various aspects 
of the act were implemented properly, and assigned the Director of OMB the 
“responsibility for improving the acquisition, use, and disposal of IT by the 
Federal Government” (Clinger-Cohen Act, 2015). 
b. Section 804 of Public Law 107–314 – Also known as the NDAA for FY 2003, 
required the OSD and the DOD to implement various improvements to 
software acquisition processes (GAO 09-888, 2009).   
c. Section 332 of Public Law 108–375 – Also known as the NDAA for FY 2005, 
amended Chapter 131 of Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222 by inserting a new section for 
DOD’s business systems, architecture, accountability, and modernization. The 
act established annual reporting requirements to congressional defense 
committees in order to ensure statutory compliance. As amended, Section 332 
of the act addresses provisions pertaining to DOD’s BEA, ETP, investment 
management, investment certification and approval, mandated budgetary 
reporting, and other such as human capital (GAO 15-627, 2015b). 
d. Section 904 of Public Law 110–181 – Also known as the NDAA for FY 2008, 
established DCMO as an Under Secretary of Defense level position to 
strengthen the management of DOD’s business operations (Deputy Chief 
Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.). The NDAA for  FY 
2008 also amended Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222 to require DPAP, in concert  with 
other functional sponsors, to update the BEA to reflect the various laws, 
regulations, or policies that have been issued (Department of Defense, 2016).   
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e. Section 901 of the NDAA for FY 2012 – Codified at Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222, 
established the DOD’s single IRB, known as the DBC, which serves as the 
principal subsidiary of the DMAG to lead efforts to reduce costs and optimize 
business operations (Department of Defense, 2014). 
While it is rather apparent that there are numerous legislative measures which have 
been enacted over the past two (2) decades to address DOD’s business systems 
modernization efforts, the authors have presented a myriad of issues and challenges herein 
which continue to prohibit the successful achievement of intended outcomes. These 
challenges and issues are further underscored by a number of separate research efforts such 
as those which are captured by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 
report entitled “Transformation of the Department of Defense’s Business Systems” which 
found that the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 overlap in the area of IT acquisition and introduce an 
unnecessary level of complication by making it more difficult to implement Defense 
business transformation because they blur responsibility and accountability (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2009, p. 31). Dr. Jacques S. Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 report also 
found that the NDAA for FY 2008 complicated Defense business transformation by 
establishing DCMO as a new layer of management in the middle of the acquisition process 
which could potentially create additional confusion (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2009, p. 31).   
Information is readily available regarding DOD’s overall business systems 
investment certifications. For instance, Chapter III provided recent data obtained from 
congressional reports on Defense business operations which show that approximately 
ninety percent (90%) of the FY 2014 requested funding in the amount of $6,996 million 
was ultimately approved, and that funding for 1,182 business systems in the amount of 
$6,900 million was approved in FY 2015; a decrease of approximately five percent (5%) 
from the FY 2014 appropriation. This captures just how significant the scope and scale is 
for DOD’s business systems.   
However, insufficient detail is provided with respect to the efficiency with which 
those funds are expended, and the effectiveness those funds have on DOD’s overall 
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business systems modernization efforts. Additionally, the authors were unable to obtain 
funding-related information that provides sufficient detail regarding the true cost of the 
development and implementation of DOD’s CWSs. If such CWS-related costs are being 
actively tracked by DOD, they do not appear to be captured in congressional reports which 
provide valuable insight for decision makers which are involved in the authorization and 
appropriation process. This indicates that the TIPS© foundation of authorization and 
appropriation for DOD’s CWSs does not appear to be fully-optimized. 
For these reasons, rather than analyze historical trend data pertaining to DOD’s 
overall business systems investment certifications over the past two (2) decades, the 
authors present the following questions which should be considered by DOD and 
congressional leadership for the purpose of increasing the optimization of the TIPS© 
authorization and appropriation foundation with respect to CWSs utilized by the DOD: 
a. How much funding is required to sufficiently modernize DOD’s CWSs? 
b. Is funding currently allocated for the development and implementation of 
DOD’s CWSs efficiently being utilized? 
c. Are there measures in place to monitor the effective utilization of funding 
which has been allocated for the modernization of DOD’s CWSs? 
d. Are there legislative actions that can be undertaken to positively incentivize 
Defense Departments to pursue long-term cost savings resulting from CWS 
development despite short-term cost barriers? 
e. Are there ways to improve overall communication efforts between DOD and 
congressional leaders which would enable collaborative modernization efforts 
in a more proactive manner? 
2. TIPS© – Personnel 
The TIPS© pillar of personnel provides the “critical link between personnel rank, 
position, credential, and capability—in other words, having the right people with the right 
skill sets in the right positions within the organizational framework” (Yoder, 2010, pp. 42-
43). Chapter III provided detail regarding how legislative authorities have shaped the 
structure in which DOD operates within to implement new strategies and corrective 
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actions, and included identification of key stakeholders responsible with decision making 
authorities for DOD business system modernization efforts. As demonstrated by the 
preceding analysis of the TIPS© authorization and appropriation foundation, many of the 
stakeholder and workforce concerns pertaining to CWS modernization are inextricably 
linked to funding and other requirements established by statute. This underscores the 
importance that both the TIPS© authorization and appropriation foundation, and the 
TIPS© personnel pillar, be in harmony with each other. While the authors acknowledge 
the criticality of ensuring DOD’s workforce is appropriately staffed, resourced, trained, 
and otherwise equipped to foster CWS modernization efforts, particular emphasis is placed 
on stakeholder analysis. 
a. In order to properly analyze the dilemma of DOD’s business system 
modernization efforts with respect to personnel, the stakeholders involved in 
the decision making process should be closely examined. Accordingly, the 
stakeholders identified and discussed by Chapter III are summarized below for 
further emphasis:  
b. DMAG – Serves as the “DBSMC, which is a joint committee of senior leaders, 
chaired by the DSD, responsible for executing a common management 
approach across” DOD’s processes (Department of Defense, 2013, p. 9). 
c. DBC – The DBC serves as the principal subsidiary body to the DMAG “for 
vetting issues related to management, improvement of defense business 
operations; and other issues to include performance management, pursuant to 
the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010” (Deputy 
Chief Management Officer, n.d.). The DBC leads efforts to reduce costs and 
optimize business operations as the DOD continues to implement institutional 
reforms. 
d. Fourth Estate Working Group – This stakeholder is comprised of organizational 
entities which are not in the Military departments or the Combatant Commands. 
These include the OSD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of 
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the Inspector General, the Defense Agencies, and Field Activities (Department 
of Defense, 2015a).  
e. DCMO – This stakeholder is an Under Secretary of Defense level position 
which was established to strengthen the management of DOD’s business 
operations (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” 
n.d.). The DCMO is vital in serving as the DOD’s Process Improvement 
Officer, creating a culture that is performance based which is piloted by strategy 
of cross-functional procedures, tracking established metrics, and ensuring 
requirements are met in a timely manner (Deputy Chief Management Officer, 
DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.). The creation of the DOD’s BEA, SMP, 
Investment Review Process, and ETP are the primary responsibility of the 
DCMO (Deputy Chief Management Officer, DCMO web page, “About,” n.d.) 
f. PSAs – The Secretary’s PSAs act as business line owners, and fulfill a key role 
through the development of functional strategies that lay the foundation for the 
investment management process while also establishing the context for 
portfolio management efforts (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 3). 
g. Components and Agencies – These stakeholders are of comprised of Military 
of Departments, Defense Agencies, and Field Activities which execute and 
record data on all performance and milestone fulfillment (Department of 
Defense, 2015b). During the investment review cycle, Components provide and 
explain respective roadmaps to the target environment described by the ETP, as 
established by the DCMO and DBC (Department of Defense, 2014, pp. 10-11).   
h. DPAP – This is another key collaborative stakeholder which drives the 
successful implementation of DOD’s strategic goals (Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy, n.d.). DPAP accomplishes this from a functional 
perspective by scrutinizing, ranking by importance, and then approving for 
execution those requirements which have been established by statute or 
regulation.   
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The term stakeholder analysis is “the process of identifying the individuals or 
groups that are likely to affect or be affected by a proposed action, and then sorting them 
according to their impact on the action as well as the impact that action will have on them” 
(Stakeholder analysis, 2016). Stakeholders are those individuals that need to be considered 
in achieving project goals (Babou, 2008). According to Babou, the identification of all 
stakeholders is a critical element to ensuring the success of the effort.  
It is the authors’ belief that much of the DOD’s failure to properly modernize their 
business systems, specifically the CWSs, is due to a failure in properly engaging the 
stakeholders who utilize DOD CWSs. It is the authors’ opinion that there is a strong 
disconnect in the personnel/functionalities that rely upon a properly working CWS and 
those that are decision makers. This perspective is largely supported by the fact that none 
of the of governing documents discussed by Chapter III, fully identify or discuss all of the 
stakeholders which have been determined by the authors’ as being integral to the success 
effort for CWSs. Accordingly, the authors present the following stakeholders which, in 
addition to the stakeholders identified above, should have more prominent involvement in 
the planning and implementation of any DOD CWS change efforts:   
a. Contract Specialist / Contracting Officer – The Contract Specialist and/or 
Contracting Officer is the primary user of DOD CWSs. These stakeholders are 
responsible for the creation, execution, and modification of solicitations and 
contract documents within the CWS. In order to be able to perform these roles, 
these stakeholders need a dependable CWS that can be used for all types of 
contract actions. The DOD CWS should have maximum connectivity to other 
systems. Proper involvement of these stakeholders would result in a more 
refined CWS, and could result in dramatic improvement with respect to 
operational efficiency. 
b. Budget Analyst / Financial Manager / Comptroller – These stakeholders impact 
the Contract Specialist and/or Contracting Officer’s ability to properly obligate 
and/or de-obligate funding within the CWS. These stakeholders are integral to 
the processing of funding documents, whether that function is integrated into 
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the CWS or, more commonly, performed within a Legacy financial system 
which then interfaces with the CWS in conjunction with each contract action. 
Proper involvement of these stakeholders could significantly reduce funding-
related complications which the authors contend often plague CWSs and burden 
the primary users.   
c. Program Manager – These stakeholders are ultimately accountable for 
performance of the overall success of a program, and are inextricably linked to 
the functions performed by the contracting and budgetary stakeholders 
discussed above.   
d.  Supported Customers – These stakeholders represent the primary reason 
contract actions need to be executed from within a CWS in the first place. 
Proper involvement of supported customers will help ensure CWS 
functionalities are consistent with requirements drivers, and would provide 
valuable insight regarding the effectiveness of the CWS. 
e. Contracted Entities – While these stakeholders are external to the development 
and implementation of DOD’s CWSs, their proper involvement could yield 
valuable insight regarding the effectiveness of CWSs, as well as the potential 
incorporation of best practices from contracting methods amongst private 
industry. 
f. Taxpayers – The taxpayer is the ultimate contributor of funding for CWS 
modernization, and DOD personnel salaries. It is imperative that the most 
efficient and effective CWSs are being utilized to ensure taxpayer dollars are 
being expended properly. 
Based on the analysis presented herein, the authors have determined that DOD’s 
current CWS environment is rather sub-optimal with respect to the TIPS© pillar of 
personnel. Accordingly, the authors present the following questions which should be 
considered by DOD leadership for the purpose of increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which DOD’s workforce is able to support CWS modernization efforts: 
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a. Who are the stakeholders involved with CWS modernization efforts, and are 
those stakeholders integrated properly? 
b. Do DOD leaders responsible for CWS modernization, as well as users of the 
CWSs themselves, possess the requisite training and experience? 
c. Who are the users of the CWS, and what are their needs? 
g. How many users of the CWS are there? 
h. How much concurrent usage of the CWS is there? Average? Peak? 
i. What type of transactions do users need to perform within the CWS? 
j. How many transactions are being performed? And when? 
k. How long does it take for users to perform transactions within the CWS? 
l. Are there potential transactional savings (in terms of both cost and time) of 
CWS alternatives being considered? If so, how can those transactional costs 
be determined, measured, and reported to leadership? 
3. TIPS© – Protocol 
The TIPS© pillar of protocol is “defined as the rules, decision-making framework, 
and business models employed” and consist of the “complex set of logic-based systems 
that allow business operations to follow sound practices” (Yoder, 2010, p. 43). Chapter III 
provided detail regarding how legislative authorities have shaped the structure in which 
DOD operates within to implement new strategies and corrective actions through the 
DBC’s management of the IBF, illustrated by Figure 5. Within Chapter III, the authors 
discussed how the IBF leverages a cross-functional framework to rationalize system 
investments, as business enablers, by aligning strategy with planned spending (Department 
of Defense, 2014, p. 2). The IBF is aligned with the guiding principles established in the 
SMP/ASP and enables DOD business leaders to instill a cost culture, institutionalize E2E 
business processes, align business operations, and modernize and rationalize business 
systems.   
Primary components of the IBF were previously discussed by Chapter III, but are 
summarized below for further emphasis: 
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a. Enterprise Guidance – The IBF begins with aligning the NSS, DSG, and other 
enterprise-wide strategic documents such as the QDR, and the SMP/ASP to 
push the expansion and implementation of functional strategies which meet or 
exceed the DOD’s business goals (Department of Defense, 2013).   
b. Functional Strategies – The functional strategies developed by the Secretary’s 
PSAs align with the SMP/ASP and address its goals, initiatives, and 
performance measures to assess progress against expected outcomes for each 
functional area (Department of Defense, 2014). Chapter III further detailed a 
particular DOD functional strategy entitled the “Strategic Plan for Defense 
Wide Procurement Capabilities (A Functional Strategy)” which is integral to 
the development and implementation of CWSs 
c. BEA – DCMO is required by Title 10 U.S.C. § 2222 for developing and 
maintaining a BEA (Department of Defense, 2014). The BEA is an information 
resource comprised of the following elements: functional business 
requirements; DOD-compliant architecture products; data requirements; 
standards; and policies and system alignment data (Department of Defense, 
2014).   These elements are necessary to achieve DOD’s plans to transform and 
mature the business environment. 
d. OEPs – OEPs are developed by Components to describe how they will execute 
their respective business strategies, and show how a Component selects its 
portfolio of IT investments to align to goals and objectives captured in the SMP/
ASP, functional strategies, and the BEA (Department of Defense, 2014).    
e. ETP – DOD’s ETP identifies the set of blueprints and decisions to transition to 
the target environment and monitors transition progress (Department of 
Defense, 2014).    
The authors acknowledge the extensive governing documents which address 
DOD’s business systems modernization efforts; however, based on the myriad of issues 
and challenges regarding these governing documents which have been presented 
previously, the authors have determined these governing documents fall short of achieving 
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intended outcomes. Just because so many governing documents exist to support DOD’s 
business systems modernization efforts does not necessarily mean they are fostering 
efficient and effective operational capabilities. In review of the various governing 
documents identified above, the authors found a significant lack of detailed information 
with respect to CWS development and implementation, which indicates that particular 
aspect of DOD’s modernization efforts has not been sufficiently emphasized. Therefore, 
and based on the analysis presented herein, the authors have determined that DOD’s current 
CWS environment is sub-optimal with respect to the TIPS© pillar of protocol.   
Targeted improvements to the TIPS© pillar of protocol may be accomplished 
through issuance of new or revised regulations, guidance, and policies; but the authors 
emphasize the importance of remembering the challenges and pitfalls of the past before 
simply adding to the problem with yet even more direction. Accordingly, the authors 
present the following questions which should be considered by DOD leadership for the 
purpose of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness with which DOD’s protocols support 
CWS modernization efforts: 
a. Are the myriad of separately published functional strategies properly 
integrated? 
b. Does DOD’s ASP truly account for the CWS needs of individual Departments 
and/or Components? 
c. Are there governing documents available that could be revised to more directly 
deal with a particular problem which is inhibiting CWS modernization? 
4. TIPS© – Platform 
The TIPS© pillar of platform consists of “those hardware and tangible software 
systems that provide the mechanisms for analysis, decision making, and communication” 
(Yoder, 2010, p. 43). This TIPS© element encompasses a significant amount of the 
information presented within this document, and is the primary focus for this JAP.  
Currently the DOD is facing increasing pressure to modernize the enterprise 
architecture system, which includes CWSs. As previously discussed in Chapter II, the GAO 
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has issued many reports stating these areas are determined to be high risk and the DOD is 
currently utilizing seventeen (17) various CWSs (excluding legacy or homegrown systems) 
which interface with the CWSs. Accordingly, the authors’ analysis pertaining to the TIPS© 
pillar of platform will provide a more thorough discussion of three (3) alternatives with 
which DOD could employ in its efforts to modernize its CWSs 
 Why Modernization is Important 
In February of 2015, the Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield computer systems were 
compromised in a sophisticated data breach impacting 78.8 million people, of which 1.3 
million were federal employees (Anthem medical data breach, 2016). In June of 2015 the 
Office of Personnel Management discovered a major security breach that had taken place 
in early 2014. This data breach impacted 21.5 million federal employees to include retirees 
and others who had undergone a background investigation for employment purposes 
(Office of Personnel Management data breach, 2016). Due to increased cybersecurity 
threats, the rapid pace at which computer technology is evolving, and the ages of the CWSs 
currently being utilized, the modernization effort is receiving ever increasing visibility. 
Currently, each Department has almost no immediate incentive to implement a new CWS 
and the short term risks (cost, human resources, time, and training) associated with the 
modernization effort act as a deterrent from major progress. However, due to the rise in 
cybersecurity breaches, the use of antiquated technology, software systems requiring 
higher amounts of memory, and increased processing speeds, the modernizations effort is 
already long overdue and the modernization of the CWS used by acquisition professionals 
is reaching a critical point.  
 Identification of Alternatives 
The DOD has three (3) high level alternatives available, two (2) of which actually 
meet the GAO requirements and one does not. These alternatives are as follows: 1) 
implement an enterprise wide CWS; 2) implement Department specific CWSs; and 3) 
maintain the status quo. 
 78 
Alternative 1: Enterprise Wide CWS 
Implementing the same CWS for the entire DOD:  The approach to this alternative 
involves the DOD migrating to one (1) system or two (2) specific systems that contain all 
the necessary functionality. These systems would be utilized by all acquisition 
professionals. This system or systems would be responsible for awarding and administering 
multiple types of contracts (Large Contracts, Sole Sources, SAPs, etc.). 
Alternative 2: Department Specific CWS  
Each Department implementing their own CWS:  This alternative allows each 
Department (Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense) to choose or develop a CWS independently allowing for customization. These 
systems would be responsible for awarding and administering multiple types of contracts 
(Large Contracts, Sole Sources, SAPs, etc.) and tailored to that Departments specific needs 
in terms of functionality and feeder systems.   
Alternative 3: Status Quo 
Status Quo is a Latin phrase meaning “the existing state of affairs” (Status quo, 
2016). This alternative is to maintain the current seventeen (17) systems used by each 
Department. This alternative allows each Department to keep monetary costs associated 
with modernizing the CWS low in the immediate future.   
 Criteria for Selecting Alternatives: 
Six (6) selection criteria were established in order to analyze each alternative 
against. The first of the six (6) criteria is Resources:  How much time, money, and effort 
will be invested into this solution?  The second of the six criteria is Complexity of 
Implementation:  How complex will this solution be?  The third is Infrastructure:  What is 
the impact to the current Information Technology Infrastructure? The fourth is 
Compatibility:  How compatibility will the new CWS be with the existing IT Infrastructure. 
The fifth is GAO Compliance:  Is this alternative compliant?  The final is Cybersecurity 
Risk:  What security risks are associated with this alternative and what is the possible 
impact of a security breach?   These criteria help identify and address various root causes 
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that are or can impede the modernization effort and risk ratings (Green/Low, Yellow/
Moderate, and Red/High) used in the analysis process.   
For the purposes of analyzing the alternatives, the authors of this JAP used the 
following definitions. Green (Low) is defined as the alternative has strengths or benefits 
that outweigh any weaknesses or risks. The risk associated with this alternative is low. A 
rating of Yellow (Moderate) signifies that the alternative has strengths or benefits that are 
offset by known weaknesses or risks. The risk associated with this alternative is moderate. 
A rating of Red (High) signifies that the alternative has weaknesses and risk that outweigh 
known strengths and benefits. The risk associated with this alternative is high  
Resources (Cost, Time, & Human Capital):  
This criteria measures the monetary cost associated with a major software 
implementation, the time involved to complete from Market Research through final go-
live, and the number of human capital it would take to implement the new system and 
trainers for end users for the alternative. 
a. Green (Low) – Means that the resources (cost, time, & human capital) 
required to implement this alternative is low. Benefits greatly outweigh 
the costs.  
b. Yellow (Moderate) – Means that the resources required to implement this 
solution are moderate.  
c. Red (High) – Means that the resources required to successfully implement 
this solution are high (millions of dollars in spending, training, and 
hundreds of people). The cost greatly outweighs benefits.  
Complexity of Implementation (Size, Number of Users, and Integration of Legacy 
and Feeder Systems):  
This criteria measures the complexity of the software implementation, taking into 
account the number of users impacted and the integration of existing feeder and legacy 
systems of the alternative.  
a. Green (Low) – Means there are a couple processes and systems that would 
require change and little time is devoted to the implementation. If changes 
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exist, each change is relatively simple. Ease of implementation outweighs 
the normal risk associated with a system implementation.  
b. Yellow (Moderate) – Means there are some key complexities  which 
involve sole risk, but through can most likely be mitigated or minimized.  
c. Red (High) – Means that the time necessary to successfully implement this 
solution could take five years or more.   Complexity of the implementation 
greatly exceeds the normal risk associated with a system implementation. 
Infrastructure (Size, Number of Users, and Integration of Legacy and Feeder 
Systems):  
This criteria measures the complexity of the software implementation, taking into 
account the number of users impacted and the integration of existing feeder and legacy 
systems of the alternative. 
a. Green (Low) – The information technology implications for this 
alternative would be low. If changes exist, the change is relatively simple 
from a hardware and software aspect.  
b. Yellow (Moderate) – The information technology implications for this 
alternative would be moderate. If changes exist, the change is moderately 
complex from a hardware and software aspect. 
c. Red (High) – The information technology implications for this alternative 
would be high. If changes exist, the change is extremely complex from a 
hardware and software aspect. 
Compatibility (Capacity for multiple systems to work together):   
This criteria measures the compatibility issues that arise during any software 
implementation and the capacity for multiple hardware and software systems to work 
together without having to alter the existing Information Technology environment. 
a. Green (Low) – Means overall minimal compatibility concerns between the 
current software system and the new software system. 
b. Yellow (Moderate) – Means overall moderate compatibility concerns between 
the current software system and the new software system. 
 81 
c. Red (High) – Means overall significant compatibility concerns between the 
current software system and the new software system. 
GAO Compliance Potential:   
This criteria measures the potential compliance with GAOs’ recommendations. 
a. Green (Low) – Means the alternative is fully compliant.  
b. Yellow (Moderate) – Means the alternative is partially compliant or 
neutral. 
c. Red (High) – Means this alternative is not compliant with previous GAO 
recommendations.  
Cyber Security:   
This criteria measures how vulnerable this alternative is to cybersecurity threats 
and the overall impact to the DOD. 
a. Green (Low) – The cyber security risk is low.   DOD wide impact of a hack 
is low. Hardware and Software are modern enough to handle security software 
updates and pushes.  
b. Yellow (Moderate) – The cyber security risk is moderate. Hardware and 
Software could handle security software updates and pushes in the near term, 
but long term abilities are unknown. Additional software (antivirus, patches, 
etc.) will slow the network down. 
c. Red (High) – The cyber security risk is high. Hardware and Software are 
not modern enough to handle security software updates and pushes. Additional 
software (antivirus, patches, etc.) will slow the network down considerably.  
 Evaluation of Alternatives 
Table 5 identifies the three (3) alternatives in the vertical rows and the selection 
criteria in the horizontal rows. Within each block is a high level analysis of each alternative 
identified and the benefits/risks associated with each selection criteria.   
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Table 5.   Evaluation Matrix 
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Alternative 1: Enterprise Wide CWS – Pros, Cons, and Implementation:   
As shown in Table 5, implementing an enterprise wide CWS for the entire DOD 
has an overall ranking of red due to the significant cost, human capital, and physical 
resources required, and would greatly contribute to the root causes which have impeded 
DOD’s modernization effort. In order to modernize the system, the DOD would have to 
fund the modernization effort up front while continuing to pay for support through the 
implementation. Training would have to be developed and provided for every Contract 
Specialist, Contracting Officer and any other user of the CWS system. However, long term 
training costs would decrease due to the standardization. The cost associated with this 
alternative is also considerably high and can potentially lead to higher future costs since 
the DOD has chosen one single provider for the CWS providing influence for future cost 
increases of support. If data rights to the CWS were not acquired, the DOD would create a 
sole source environment thus limiting future competition and repeating historical 
acquisition errors.   
Due to the size and complexity of a single system, a phased implementation would 
be required, allowing the DOD to correct any compatibility or network issues as they arise, 
creating lessons learned through each implementation. However, a lengthy timeline for the 
CWS implementation could potentially keep the DOD consistently behind in the 
modernization effort. Currently each command has multiple legacy systems (to include 
homegrown systems) which interface with the current CWS environment; one single 
system would be burdened down by the volume of interfaces if each legacy system is kept 
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online. If the DOD was to retire all legacy systems, additional functionality would be 
required in order to fill the gaps left in response. The major risk associated with one single 
system is the risk of cybersecurity breaches. If a cybersecurity breach were to occur at the 
end of the fiscal year, billions of dollars would not be obligated due to systems being taken 
offline to prevent additional compromise. This risk could be mitigated by utilizing multiple 
server sites to minimize the overall impact the DOD if a breach were to occur. While this 
alternative is compliant with GAO recommendations and a complete upgrade in 
infrastructure could support future requirements and software implementations; overall, 
the risks significantly outweigh the benefits. 
Alternative 2: Department Specific CWS – Pros, Cons, and Implementation: 
As shown in Table 5, allowing each Department to implement their own system (or 
systems) presents the lowest risk and mitigates most identified risks. A possible cause in 
the delay in the modernization effort is the unwillingness to retire specific customized 
systems belonging to each Department. In this alternative, each Department can ensure that 
the chosen system(s) are compatible across current multiple infrastructure platforms and 
can interface successfully with legacy/feeder systems.  
Ensuring competition is a key objective of the DOD and this alternative would keep 
modernization industry partners stable and allow for future competitive environments, thus 
reducing long term acquisition costs. While this alternative would still take three to five 
years to implement from Market Research through the final go-live, it would take 
considerably less time than the single system just based on the size, scope and complexity 
of that alternative and require a moderate level of resources in comparison.   Since each 
Department would implement their own system, the location of servers would not be 
centralized decreasing the impact of cybersecurity breaches. Even though any 
implementation would take considerable time, money, and resources than maintaining the 
current systems; an implementation on a smaller scale represents an overall lower risk 
while still accomplishing GAO’s recommendations.  
 85 
Alternative 3: Status Quo – Pros, Cons, and Implementation:  
As shown in Table 5, the status quo provides a reasonable alternative for the 
immediate short term; however, risk increases significantly in the future. There would be 
little resistance from stakeholders that utilize the system on a daily a basis; however, 
eventually the antiquated software systems would not be compatible with new software 
pushes.   In the current environment, networks and systems are already stressed due to lack 
of bandwidth and the number of users greatly exceeding the original estimation, which 
impacts the user’s ability to complete required actions and this issue would only increase 
exponentially in the future.   Since there would be no immediate system migration, there is 
no time involved in implementing this alternative and no training of users to be completed. 
Even though the short term implications are low risk, each year that the status quo is 
maintained the greater the long term risk and the dilemma of why intended outcomes have 
not been fully realized. Departments and agencies could mitigate risk to upgrading on an 
as needed basis providing constant short term fixes.   
 Summary of Analysis for the TIPS© Platform Pillar 
Based on this analysis, the authors have determined that DOD’s current CWS 
environment is significantly sub-optimal with respect to the TIPS© pillar of platform. 
While DOD’s current CWSs are not currently an impediment to mission fulfillment, 
significant challenges remain with respect to the manner in which these systems facilitate 
efficient and effective contracting. Three (3) different alternatives were presented and 
when six (6) criteria were analyzed, the best alternative is each Department implementing 
one or two CWS’s; however, there are many challenges that must be overcome. An 
example of which is integrating the DOD’s ARRT Tool that is used in the development of 
Performance Work Statements. Since this tool is already functional and known throughout 
the Contracting community, it is in the DOD’s best interest to focus on the CWS 
modernization and integrate existing tools during the implementation process. 
 86 
 TIPS© Analysis – Successful Organization 
As stated previously, the TIPS© analytical framework consists of four (4) primary 
criteria, as follows: 1) All three (3) pillars require a strong foundation of authorization and 
appropriation; 2) Each individual element of the TIPS© model needs to be optimized 
(meaning that it is efficient, and effective); 3) All three (3) pillars need to be in harmony; 
and 4) Together, all four (4) elements of the TIPS© model are required to be mature in 
order to support a successful organization. Within the context of the subject JAP, the 
“successful organization” depicted in Figure 11 consists of the DOD’s successful 
utilization of its CWSs to accomplish its mission. Based on the analysis provided above, 
the authors have determined that the three (3) primary TIPS© pillars of personnel, 
protocols, and platforms are not in harmony with each another, and are built upon a TIPS© 
foundation of authorization and appropriation that is currently providing sub-optimal 
efficiency and effectiveness. A number of complex challenges remain. Therefore, maturity 
gaps currently exist which require diligent action if they are to be overcome. While the 
subsequently provided recommendations will address maturity gaps for each TIPS© 
element, the authors place significant emphasis on the TIPS© pillar of platform given that 
it encompasses the primary focus of this JAP.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter applied the TIPS© analytical framework to enable the authors to better 
synthesize the information previously presented herein, and facilitated the determination 
of potential root causes which are inhibiting successful modernization efforts. The 
subsequent chapter builds upon this analytical foundation by providing the authors’ 





The following seven (7) recommendations are provided within the context of the 
TIPS© analytical framework for the purposes of improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of DOD’s utilization of electronic procurement systems to accomplish its mission 
objectives. While these recommendations will address maturity gaps for each TIPS© 
element, the authors place significant emphasis on the TIPS© pillar of platform given that 
it encompasses the primary focus of this JAP.   
B. TIPS© – AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION  
1. Recommendation 1: Establish an integrated council comprised of 
DOD and congressional stakeholders to collaboratively address CWS 
modernization efforts 
This recommendation involves establishing an integrated council comprised of 
DOD and congressional stakeholders to collaboratively implement CWS modernization 
efforts. Currently, there are too many degrees of separation between members of Congress, 
which are involved in the authorization and appropriation process, and DOD leadership 
which is responsible for implementing statutory requirements such as those pertaining to 
the modernization of its business systems. These degrees of separation create a significant 
communication barrier wherein congressional direction may not adequately account for 
implementation challenges, and places DOD in a rather reactive role as it struggles to 
comply with established statutes in a constrained resource environment.   
An integrated council would be a more proactive approach. The structure for this 
integrated council would need to allow for Departments to have more of a voice in the 
authorization and appropriation process with respect to CWS modernization needs, and for 
congressional members to have more visibility on DOD’s CWS implementation efforts. 
The integrated council would be responsible for identifying issues and challenges 
pertaining to CWS modernization, establishing proper approaches to address those issues 
and challenges, collecting data to better assess the efficiency and effectiveness with which 
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CWSs are modernized, and adapting to changes to the overall business systems 
modernization environment. The integrated council’s aforementioned responsibilities 
would have the added benefit of allowing DOD and congressional stakeholders to focus on 
solving specific factors that contribute to DOD’s business systems as being designated as 
high risk by GAO. For example, the integrated council would be able to fulfill the role of 
a review board that solely focusses on high risk systems which would address an area that 
has yet to be fully-implemented by DOD, as previously discussed by the authors’ summary 
of GAO Report No. 14-486 from Chapter II (GAO 14-486, 2014).   
 Pros 
An integrated council comprised of DOD and congressional stakeholders would 
centralize overall modernization efforts, and provide a forward-focused vision for 
implementation. The integrated council could ensure goals are met in a timely fashion and 
formulate risk mitigation plans should issues arise. Since responsibilities are centralized, 
the integrated council can be held accountable for milestones and objectives.  
b. Cons 
This recommendation removes leadership actions from the Departments 
implementing the new CWS, adds yet an additional management layer, and could result in 
duplicative functions if this recommendation is not implemented in conjunction with 
concurrent reductions of the responsibilities of other stakeholders.  
C. TIPS© – PERSONNEL 
1. Recommendation 2: Revise DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plan to 
include additional training for military department portfolio 
managers and other officials responsible for CWS modernization 
This recommendation involves incorporating necessary revisions to DOD’s 
Strategic Workforce Plan to provide additional education and experience qualifications for 
military department portfolio managers and other officials responsible for CWS 
modernization efforts, as well as to provide for interagency personnel rotations to increase 
awareness of CWS alternatives and best practices. As previously discussed by the authors’ 
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summary of GAO Report No. 15-627 from Chapter II, GAO interviewed various military 
department portfolio managers and other officials as required by the NDAA for FY 2015 
and received input regarding a cultural resistance to change and a lack of necessary skills 
which contributed to the DOD’s ability to achieve many of the provisions contained in the 
NDAA for FY 2005 (GAO 15-627, 2015b).   The finding contained in GAO’s 2015 report 
is not a new one. Dr. Jacques S. Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 report addressed 
a similar finding that “DOD employees involved with business transformation often lack 
the necessary experience and skills to spearhead the planning and management of the 
business transformation implementation within the scope envisioned” (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2009, p. 33). Accordingly, this recommendation builds from the findings 
presented by Dr. Jacques S. Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 report, and GAO’s 
2015 report by emphasizing the importance of investing in the personnel responsible for 
the critical and monumental task of modernizing DOD’s CWSs.   
 Pros 
The authors anticipate implementation of this recommendation would dramatically 
improve DOD’s ability to achieve the results envisioned by the NDAA for FY 2005. A 
stronger, more well-informed, and experienced workforce would pay dividends with 
respect to developing and implementing CWSs. 
 Cons 
It remains unclear exactly what type of training is required. The full nature and 
extent of additional training requirements, how training should be structured and 
administered, and identification of the individuals which should receive that training 
remain unknown. Moreover, in the current environment, training would need to encompass 
a myriad of Legacy systems, as well as account for the development of more modernized 
CWSs. These complexities could be mitigated through consolidation and standardization 
of CWSs; resulting in a more efficient approach to training programs.  
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2. Recommendation 3:  Strengthen horizontal and vertical relationships 
amongst DOD’s CWS stakeholders 
This recommendation is unique from the concept the authors provided in the first 
recommendation which focused on increasing communication between the DOD and 
congressional stakeholders. This recommendation specifically addresses the lack of 
engagement from the newly identified stakeholders (e.g., Contract Specialists, Contracting 
Officers, Budget Analysts, Financial Managers, Comptrollers, Program Managers, 
supported customers, et cetera) presented by the authors in Chapter V. Additionally, this 
recommendation also builds from an important concept presented by Dr. Jacques S. 
Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 report which involved “tiered accountability” 
within the DBSMC wherein functional competencies were horizontally integrated across 
the enterprise (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2009, p. 6).   
The previously established horizontal integration discussed by Dr. Jacques S. 
Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 report should be strengthened to ensure the 
personnel contributing to the modernization of IT, cyber security, CWS, and other related 
business systems are able to collaborate effectively.     
Moreover, the governing bodies of DOD’s overall modernization effort should 
become more vertically aligned with those personnel which are executing its objectives. 
For instance, the organizational structure of the DBC and/or DCMO could be revised to 
allow for the establishment position(s) for the newly identified stakeholders (e.g., Contract 
Specialists, Contracting Officers, Budget Analysts, Financial Managers, Comptrollers, 
Program Managers, supported customers, et cetera) presented by the authors in Chapter V. 
Those positions could allow for personnel rotations on a three (3) to six (6) month basis, 
wherein top performing functional representatives could be nominated through their chain 
of command to be temporarily involved with higher-tier stakeholders for the purposes of 
improving CWS development and implementation efforts.   
 Pros 
The horizontal integration emphasized by this recommendation would enhance the 
various functional strategies which are produced by IT, cyber security, CWS, and other 
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related business systems representatives, and which are provided to the DBSMC, DBC, 
DCMO and other higher-tier stakeholders. Furthermore, the vertical integration 
emphasized by this recommendation would ensure higher-tier stakeholders are better 
informed, as well as directly benefiting lower-tier personnel through enhanced training, 
experience, and recognition opportunities. 
 Cons 
This recommendation would blend the leadership provided by higher-tier 
stakeholders with the execution provided by lower-tier stakeholders which could result in 
unintended consequences pertaining to reduced management and operational efficiencies. 
For instance, meetings typically conducted only amongst higher-tier stakeholders would 
likely take more time and would have to be re-structured to accommodate the direct 
involvement of lower-tier stakeholders. Additionally, the direct involvement of lower-tier 
stakeholders would negatively impact their ability to execute normal workload priorities.   
These types of challenges could be mitigated through implementation of control measures 
such as re-designed meeting structures/frequencies, and the temporary backfilling of 
positions vacated by lower-tier stakeholders following their nomination to be temporarily 
involved with higher-tier stakeholders. 
D. TIPS© – PROTOCOL 
1. Recommendation 4: Enhance data and metrics being provided for 
compliance with the Government Performance and Results 
Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) 
Chapter III presented information regarding of DOD’s Strategic Plan for Defense 
Wide Procurement Capabilities (A Functional Strategy) Version 2.1 which provides 
various objectives and initiatives for FY 2016 through FY 2018 as a roadmap for the 
modernization effort broken down by the overall goal (Protecting the Future and Improving 
Efficiency). These goals encompass both enterprise systems and component systems, as 
well as, touching on many of the various elements of contract writing from clause logic to 
Product Service Codes. In order to improve overall efficiency, the DOD has laid out 
thirteen (13) different initiatives (Department of Defense, 2016). 
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While the scope and scale of those initiatives is significant, the authors have 
determined that improvement opportunities exist for enhancing data and metrics which are 
being provided by DOD in pursuit of compliance with the GPRAMA. As presented by 
Chapter III, GPRAMA was enacted to require that all agencies engage in performance 
management tasks (Public Law 13-62, 1993). GPRAMA was later revised in 2011 to 
require agencies to develop priority goals as required under Section 1120(b) of Title 31 
U.S.C and that this information be merged with the existing data required by Section 112 
of Title 31 U.S.C. Currently, the DOD is compliant with GPRAMA through its annual 
update to the Department’s Strategic Plan for Defense Wide Procurement Capabilities (A 
Functional Strategy) for FY 2016 through FY 2018. This recommendation involves 
enhancing the information provided within the aforementioned plan to capture more CWS 
specific metrics, and increasing the frequency with which the plan is updated from an 
annual basis to a quarterly basis.     
 Pros 
Quarterly updates to DOD’s Strategic Plan for Defense Wide Procurement 
Capabilities (A Functional Strategy) will heighten visibility of progress being made with 
respect to the Department’s modernization efforts, and will ensure more frequent 
assessment and mitigation of potential maturity gaps or other problematic issues that arise. 
 Cons 
Although well intended, quarterly updates to DOD’s Strategic Plan for Defense 
Wide Procurement Capabilities (A Functional Strategy) could become overly burdensome 
on existing resources (time, funding, and human capital), and result in a reduction to the 
quality of the information if resource constraints are not alleviated. These types of 
undesirable consequences could be mitigated through additional congressional support. 
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E. TIPS© – PLATFORM 
1. Recommendation 5: Focus modernization efforts more exclusively on 
CWS development and implementation  
Based on the analysis presented herein, the authors recommend that the DOD 
optimize the TIPS© pillar of platform through the DOD focusing on the CWS portion of 
the modernization effort allowing for the appropriate allocation of required resources 
necessary for this implementation. This recommendation builds on the finding presented 
in Dr. Jacques S. Gansler’s and William Lucyshyn’s 2009 report which involved the DOD 
trying to do too much in a single modernization initiative (Gansler & Lucyshyn, 2009, p. 
34).    
 Pros 
Focusing solely on the CWS aspect of DOD’s modernization effort allows for more 
resources (time, money and human capital) to be invested for that purpose. If each 
Department successfully modernized the CWS over the next five (5) years, this will have 
a significant improvement on DOD operations. The CWS is the primary tool for procuring 
and administering both services and supplies. A modern CWS will allow for future IT 
upgrades without compromising processing speed and allow for additional functionality 
that will enable acquisition professionals to be more productive.   
 Cons 
Focusing more exclusively on the modernization of CWSs does come with risks. 
The first is continuing to maintain legacy systems while paying for and implementing a 
new system. There is a significant amount of short term resource constraints associated 
with changing the status quo, and those constraints would need to be alleviated through 
congressional support. Moreover, modernization efforts across Departments would need to 
be closely coordinated. A supported customer which provides funding to various 
Departments, would be negatively impacted if the DON modernized its CWS in such a 
way that required the supported customer to alter how it’s Legacy financial system 
interfaces with the newly implemented CWS in a manner different from how that supported 
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customer’s Legacy financial system interfaces with other CWSs from other Departments. 
Furthermore, focusing more exclusively on the development and implementation of CWSs 
could negatively impact other modernization efforts across the enterprise given the 
constrained resource environment.   
2. Recommendation 6: Implement Alternative 2 (Department Specific 
CWS) 
Based on the analysis presented by Chapter V, the authors recommend that the 
DOD optimize the TIPS© pillar of platform through implementation of Alternative 2 
(Department Specific CWS). This recommendation builds from the authors’ prior 
recommendation that the DOD focus its modernization efforts more exclusively on CWSs, 
but emphasizes that the DOD do so by moving forward specifically with the development 
and implementation of Department-specific CWSs, as the authors previously presented as 
Alternative 2. 
 Pros 
The authors contend that this alternative has the highest probability to achieve short 
term and long term gains within the DOD. Focusing solely on implementation of 
Alternative 2 (Department Specific CWS) as part of DOD’s modernization efforts allows 
for resources (time, funding, and human capital) to be more effectively utilized, and 
provides for significant operational enhancements. Rather than maintaining over a dozen 
primary CWSs and a myriad of Legacy systems, the future business systems environment 
could consist of one or two primary CWSs for each Department. This would significantly 
improve the efficiency with which CWSs enable successfully achievement of mission 
objectives.   
 Cons 
There are a number of risks and challenges associated with implementation of this 
alternative. The first is continuing to maintain legacy systems while paying to develop and 
implement a new system. If a completely new CWS is developed, training and 
infrastructure would require a significant investment upfront. If the Department does not 
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implement an IT platform that has room for growth in future upgrades (hardware and 
software), as well as, the increase in users and functionality, the Department will only 
continue the current cycle of having a CWS that too easily becomes outdated. Despite the 
aforementioned, the authors contend that the benefits associated with this alternative far 
outweigh the identified risks and challenges.   
3. Recommendation 7: Establish a Functionality Circle of Excellence 
Panel for CWS development and implementation 
Based on the CWS functionalities presented in Chapter IV, as well as the analysis 
presented in Chapter V, the authors recommend that the DOD establish a Functionality 
Circle of Excellence Panel. This panel will be comprised of senior acquisition professionals 
who use the CWS on a daily basis to identify and prioritize required functionality. The 
Functionality Circle of Excellence Panel could also be a key contributor to the integrated 
council further detailed by the authors’ first recommendation, as well as the vertical 
integration efforts further detailed by the authors’ third recommendation. 
 Pros 
This approach would harness the insight provided by power (primary and 
secondary) users from every CWS to collaboratively discuss the various functionalities that 
would be most beneficial. This panel would also be integral to overcoming maturity gaps 
within the current CWS environment. The power users would have direct work experience 
with the various contract actions that need to be performed within a CWS, and be able to 
leverage that expertise to better inform DOD and congressional leadership which have the 
power to shape policies, regulations, and guidance pertaining to CWSs.   
 Cons 
The optimal composition, structure, and conduct of this panel remains unclear. In 
all likelihood, any individuals tasked with participating on this panel would need to do so 
in addition to their current duties which would further strain their ability to fulfill their 
responsibilities, and could potentially compromise the intended outcomes of the panel 
itself. Scheduling conflicts could delay results. Due to the decrease in available funding for 
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travel, getting the stakeholders comprising this panel together for a monthly or quarterly 
meeting is unlikely. Scheduling conflicts could be mitigated by utilizing remote conference 
technology, but that could lessen the desired level of collaboration.   
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided seven (7) recommendations within the context of the TIPS© 
analytical framework for the purposes of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
DOD’s utilization of electronic procurement systems, with particular emphasis on the 
importance of CWSs. While these recommendations are not intended to be all-inclusive of 
potential improvement areas, the authors contend the proffered recommendations will 





A. FINDINGS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This JAP sought to address the DOD business system modernization efforts, 
identify root causes that have prohibited significant progress, and to develop concepts and 
recommendations that can propel progress by addressing the research questions posed 
earlier:  
1. What was the catalyst for the DOD’s recent business systems 
modernization efforts, and what is the current nature of that need?  
Chapter II of this JAP discussed various GAO reports which were the catalyst to 
pushing business system modernization efforts, as well as NDAA for FY 05.   The current 
nature of that need is significant due to the consistent use of antiquated systems and 
advancements taking place in the current technological environment.   
2. Why has the DOD failed to fully meet its business systems 
modernization objectives in a timely manner?  
As further detailed by Chapter V of this JAP, the authors have identified numerous 
issues which have impeded DOD’s progress to modernize business systems. The 
recommendations presented within Chapter VI will remove previous barriers DOD has 
encountered when attempting to modernize its business systems.   
 Is there adequate representation from functional/execution-related 
personnel to fully-demonstrate the scope of the problem(s)/issue(s)?  
No, there is currently not adequate representation from functional/execution-related 
personnel. Various recommendations have been provided in Chapter VI which addressed 
this concern.  
 How entrenched are legacy systems within each service/component, and 
how feasible is it to change the status quo?  
As further detailed by the case studies presented in Chapter IV, the three (3) CWS’s 
that were analyzed under this JAP are very entrenched within their respective service / 
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component. The analysis provided by the authors included in Table 5 captured the 
feasibility of improving the status quo.  
3. What additional action is needed for the DOD to fully achieve 
intended outcomes of its business system modernization objectives?   
Implementing the seven (7) recommendations provided by Chapter VI will 
contribute greatly towards DOD’s business system modernization efforts.  
4. Are there other potential outcomes of DOD’s business systems 
modernization efforts that have not been previously accounted for, or 
particular focus areas that may yield better results?  
As discussed earlier, the DOD should specifically focus on the CWS portion of the 
modernization effort. While all seven (7) of the authors’ recommendations found in 
Chapter VI will help address maturity gaps, Recommendations 5 and 6 in particular provide 
for a more focused approached on DOD’s CWSs. In doing so, the DOD will be able to 
maximize the utilization of resources and dramatically improve efficiencies and 
effectiveness of operations.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS TO CONSIDER 
The scope and scale of DOD’s modernization efforts are significant. While much 
progress has been made, this area continues to be viewed by GAO and other stakeholders 
as a high risk concern. The seven (7) recommendations proposed by the authors are as 
follows: 
1) Recommendation 1: Establish an integrated council comprised of DOD and 
congressional stakeholders to collaboratively address CWS modernization 
efforts; 
2) Recommendation 2: Revise DOD’s Strategic Workforce Plan to include 
additional training for military department portfolio managers and other 
officials responsible for CWS modernization; 
3) Recommendation 3: Strengthen horizontal and vertical relationships amongst 
DOD’s CWS stakeholders; 
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4) Recommendation 4: Enhance data and metrics being provided for compliance 
with the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act of 2010 
(GPRAMA); 
5) Recommendation 5: Focus modernization efforts more exclusively on CWS 
development and implementation; 
6) Recommendation 6: Implement Alternative 2 (Department Specific CWS); 
7) Recommendation 7: Establish a Functionality Circle of Excellence Panel for 
CWS development and implementation 
While the seven (7) recommendations provided by the authors in Chapter VI are 
not intended to be all-inclusive of potential improvement areas, the authors contend that 
the proffered recommendations will adequately address DOD’s business system 
modernization efforts. However, there will still be numerous improvement areas that will 
need to be pursued. Various aspects of DOD’s operations, such as financial management, 
acquisition, enterprise security, installations and environment, logistics and materiel 
readiness, human resources management and security cooperation should continue to be 
explored more thoroughly. These additional areas comprise the other functional strategies 
of the Integrated Business Framework depicted by Figure 5 in Chapter III. 
  
 100 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 101 
APPENDIX A.  STATUS OF GAO RECOMMENDATIONS 
Table 6.   Status of Recommendations Made Since 2011 
GAO Report Implemented Partially Implemented GAO Assessment 
GAO 11–684 
1. The Secretary of Defense 
should expeditiously 
complete the implementation 
of the announced transfer of 
functions of the Business 
Transformation Agency and 
the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information 
Integration/Department of 
Defense Chief Information 
Officer and provide 
specificity as to when and 
where these functions will be 
transferred. (Business 
Enterprise Architecture) 
X  As we reported in May 2013, the 
department formally disestablished the 
Business Transformation Agency in 
October 2011, completing the transfer of 
its various functions to other DOD 
entities, including the Office of the 
Deputy Chief Management Officer 
(DCMO). In addition, in January 2012, 
DOD announced the disestablishment of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information Integration 
and the transfer of its various functions 
to other DOD entities, including the 
DOD Chief Information Officer and 
Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 
GAO 12-685 
2. The Secretary of Defense 
should ensure that the DSD, as 
the department’s Chief 
Management Officer, 
establish a policy that clarifies 
the roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships among the Chief 
Management Officer, Deputy 
Chief Management Officer 
(DCMO), DOD and military 
department Chief Information 
Officers, Principal Staff 
Assistants, military 
department Chief 
Management Officers, and the 
heads of the military 
departments and defense 
agencies, associated with the 
development of a federated 
business enterprise 
architecture. 
Among other things, the 
policy should address the 
development and 
implementation of an 
overarching taxonomy and 
 X The department has taken steps to 
address the intent of this 
recommendation. For example, the 
DCMO approved the Business 
Enterprise Architecture Configuration 
Control Board charter on August 19, 
2013. The board includes the Business 
Enterprise Architecture Chief Architect 
and representatives from both the 
department’s Office of the Chief 
Information Officer as well as the Chief 
Management Officer organizations of 
the Defense Business Council member 
organizations. According to its charter, 
the board is to be the principal body for 
managing the disposition of proposed 
architecture change requests. The board 
is to be supported by the Component 
Collaboration Forum, which is to focus 
on developing a path ahead for a 
federated business architecture. 
The department has also developed a 
draft plan for a federated architecture. 
However, the plan does not provide 
details on how DOD intends to extend 
architecture content across the 
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GAO Report Implemented Partially Implemented GAO Assessment 
associated ontologies to help 
ensure that each of the 
respective portions of the 
architecture will be properly 
linked and aligned. 
In addition, the policy should 
address alignment and 
coordination of business 
process areas, military 
department and defense 
agency activities associated 
with developing and 
implementing each of the 
various components of the 
Business Enterprise 
Architecture, and 
relationships among these 
entities. (Business Enterprise 
Architecture) 
 
department, including the military 
departments. In addition, the department 
has not provided details of an 
overarching taxonomy to be used across 
the enterprise or established a policy that 
clarifies roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships as called for by our 
recommendation. 
3. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the appropriate 
DOD organizations to 
establish a deadline by which 
it intends to complete the 
integration of the repositories 
and validate the completeness 
and reliability of information. 
(Mandated Budget Reporting)  
 
 
X  The department has taken steps to 
implement this recommendation. In 
particular, in 2013, the Office of the 
DCMO established the DOD 
Information Technology Investment 
Portal to serve as the authoritative data 
source for Defense Business Systems 
certification funding and approval 
information. In addition, the department 
has established common elements in its 
three primary repositories used for 
tracking information about business 
systems—DOD Information 
Technology Investment Portal, 
Department of Defense Information 
Technology Portfolio Repository, and 
Select & Native Programming Data 
Input System for Information 
Technology—that allow information 
about individual business systems to be 
integrated across the repositories.  
 
Moreover, the Office of the Chief 
Information Officer demonstrated that it 
conducts periodic data quality 
assessments. For example, the results of 
the most recent assessment provided by 
DOD demonstrate that the number of 
business systems is generally consistent 
across its repositories.  
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GAO Report Implemented Partially Implemented GAO Assessment 
 
4. The Secretary of Defense 
should ensure that the DSD, 
as the department’s Chief 
Management Officer, direct 
the Deputy Chief 
Management Officer to 
include in DOD’s annual 
report to Congress on 
compliance with 10 U.S.C. § 
2222 the results of the 
department’s business 
process reengineering efforts.  
 
Among other things, the 
results should include the 
department’s determination 
of the number of systems that 
have undergone material 
process changes, the number 
of interfaces eliminated as 
part of these efforts (i.e., by 
program, by name), and the 
status of its end-to-end 
business process 
reengineering efforts. 
(Investment Certification and 
Approval)  
 
 X The Office of the DCMO’s 2015 
Congressional Report on Defense 
Business Operations included some 
information about its business process 
reengineering efforts, but the report did 
not include the department’s 
determination of the number of systems 
that have undergone material process 
changes, the number of interfaces 
eliminated as part of these efforts (i.e., 
by program, by name), and the status of 
its end-to-end business process 
reengineering efforts. For example, the 
department’s report to Congress stated 
that the Army utilized business process 
reengineering as part of a personnel and 
pay program to reengineer 157 discrete 
personnel processes to fit the capabilities 
of a commercial enterprise resource 
planning system. While the 
department’s annual report included 
information about specific efforts, the 
Office of the DCMO has not yet reported 
on measures such as those called for by 
our recommendation.  
 
According to officials from the Office of 
the DCMO, its annual report is not 
intended to provide the level of detail 
requested by this recommendation. 
Further, these officials stated that the 
Office of the DCMO does not perform 
business process reengineering 
assessments. Rather, the pre-
certification authorities have the 
responsibility to perform business 
process reengineering. Nevertheless, 
regardless of who conducts business 
process reengineering, the department 
has not demonstrated that it has reported 
on the results of business process 
reengineering efforts as called for by our 
recommendation in either its annual 
report or in any other report to Congress.  
 
5. The DSD, as the 
department’s Chief 
Management Officer, should 
direct the Deputy Chief 
 X The Office of the DCMO provided an 
update to GAO on the numbers of 
positions filled and open. In addition, 
officials provided documentation 
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Management Officer to 
include in DOD’s annual 
report to Congress on 
compliance with 10 U.S.C. § 
2222, an update on the office 
of the DCMO’s progress 
toward filling staff positions 
and the impact of any unfilled 
positions on the ability of the 
office to conduct its work. 
(Other – Human Capital)  
  
 
associated with the department’s FY 
2016 budget request identifying 
information about changes in requested 
funds and full-time equivalent positions. 
Officials also identified examples of 
publicly available information about 
full-time equivalent positions that the 
office was seeking to fill. Nevertheless, 
an update on staffing and the impact of 
unfilled positions on the ability of the 
office to conduct its work has not yet 
been included in the annual report or in 
other reports to Congress.  
 
GAO 13-557 
6. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Deputy 
Chief Management Officer to 
define by when and how the 
department plans to develop 
an architecture that would 
extend to all defense 
components and include, 
among other things:  
 
(a) information about the 
specific business systems that 
support business enterprise 
architecture business 
activities and related system 
functions,  
(b) business capabilities for 
the Hire-to-Retire and 
Procure-to-Pay business 
processes, and  
(c) sufficient information 
about business activities to 
allow for more effective 
identification of potential 




 X The department has taken steps to 
improve the integration of Business 
Enterprise Architecture information 
with other existing information. For 
example, this integration is to allow the 
department to identify information such 
as mapping of existing business systems 
to individual Business Enterprise 
Architecture system functions. In 
addition, officials from the office of the 
DCMO provided a draft plan for 
business enterprise architecture 
federation, which includes steps 
associated with extending the 
architecture to all defense components. 
Nevertheless, officials stated that the 
plan is not yet complete.  
 
Moreover, the department has yet to 
define by when and how it will develop 
an architecture that extends to all 
defense components. Officials from the 
Office of the DCMO stated that they are 
working to federate Army business 
architecture information into the 
Business Enterprise Architecture and 
that this effort will inform future steps; 
however, that effort remains a work in 
progress.  
 
7. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Deputy 
Chief Management Officer to 
define by when and how the 
 X The Office of the DCMO has taken steps 
to improve information available about 
its business systems. More recently, the 
department has established the 
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enterprise transition plan will 
include, among other things,  
 
(a) milestones, performance 
measures, and funding plans 
for all business systems 
expected to be part of the 
target architecture and each 
system’s risks or challenges to 
integration; 
(b) time-phased end dates 
associated with terminating 
legacy systems in phases; 
(c) a listing of all other 
defense business systems 
(including systems that are 
considered to be core systems) 
that will be a part of the target 
defense business systems 
computing environment and a 
strategy for making 
modifications to those 
systems that will be needed to 
ensure that they comply with 




measures, and financial 
resource needs; and 
(d) information about how 
systems are to be sequenced 
according to, among other 
things, dependencies among 
investments. (Enterprise 
Transition Plan)  
 
Integrated Business Framework-Data 
Alignment Portal as a repository of 
automated information available about 
Functional Strategies, Organizational 
Execution Plans, and the business 
architecture. According to officials from 
the Office of the DCMO, this portal will 
be used to document, among other 
things, the data that are to be included in 
Functional Strategies and 
Organizational Execution Plans. Such a 
collective set of data may be used to 
generate transition plan information. 
However, the full implementation of this 
new approach remains to be seen. 
Moreover, the department has not 
provided a plan that defines when and 
how it will address the various elements 
called for in our recommendation.  
 
8. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Deputy 
Chief Management Officer to 
ensure that the functional 
strategies include all of the 
critical elements identified in 
DOD investment management 
guidance, including 
performance measures to 
determine progress toward 
achieving the goals that 
incorporate all of the 
 X DOD established performance measures 
in its functional strategies that addressed 
at least some of the five attributes called 
for in DOD guidance. For example, all 
of the FY 2015 functional strategies 
identified examples of quantitative 
metrics. However, not all functional 
strategies identified metrics that 
addressed the other attributes. 
Specifically, the strategies did not all 
include performance measures that 
addressed the following attributes: (1) 
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attributes called for in the 
department’s guidance. 
(Investment Management)  
 
data that are tracked incrementally over 
a specified period, (2) a baseline for each 
performance measure, (3) a target 
against the baseline, and (4) a rationale 
for the identified target. In addition, 
DOD’s FY 2016 functional strategies 
also lacked such attributes.  
 
9. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Deputy 
Chief Management Officer to 
select and control its mix of 
investments in a manner that 
best supports mission needs 
by  
 
(a) documenting a process for 
evaluating portfolio 
performance that includes the 
use of actual versus expected 
performance data and 
predetermined thresholds;  
(b) ensuring that portfolio 
assessments are conducted in 
key areas identified in our IT 
investment management 
framework: benefits attained; 
current schedule; accuracy of 
project reporting; and risks 
that have been mitigated, 
eliminated, or accepted to 
date; and  
 (c) ensuring that the 
documents provided to the 
Defense Business Council as 
part of the investment 
management process include 
critical information for 
conducting all assessments. 
(Investment Management)  
 X The department’s February 2015 
investment management guidance 
identifies four criteria and specifies the 
associated assessments that are to be 
conducted when reviewing and 
evaluating component-level 
organizational execution plans in order 
to make a portfolio-based investment 
decision. The guidance also provides 
additional details regarding considering 
return on investment when assessing 
program costs. In addition, the guidance 
states that organizational execution 
plans will be assessed from various 
perspectives, including progress toward 
the target environment, business value, 
cost, and risk.  
 
Nevertheless, the guidance does not 
specify a process for conducting an 
assessment or call for the use of actual 
versus expected performance data and 
predetermined thresholds. In addition, 
the guidance does not call for documents 
provided to the Defense Business 
Council to include critical information 
for conducting assessments, such as 
information about system scalability to 
support additional users or new features 
in the future and cost in relationship to 
return on investment.  
 
10. The Secretary of 
Defense should direct the 
Deputy Chief Management 
Officer to implement and use 
the business enterprise 
architecture and business 
process reengineering 
compliance assessments more 
effectively to support 
 X The 2015 Congressional Report on 
Defense Business Operations included 
some information consistent with our 
recommendation. For example, it 
contained information about weaknesses 
for systems that were certified with 
qualifications. In particular, the report 
stated that the department conditionally 
approved 29 military department and 30 
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organizational transformation 
efforts by  
 
(a) disclosing relevant 
information about known 
weaknesses, such as business 
enterprise architecture and 
business process 
reengineering compliance 
weaknesses for systems that 
were not certified or certified 
with qualifications in annual 
reports to Congress;  
(b) establishing milestones by 
which selected validations of 
business enterprise 
architecture compliance 
assertions are to be 
completed; and  
(c) ensuring that appropriate 
business process 
reengineering assertions have 
been completed on all 
investments submitted for the 
FY 2014 certification reviews 
prior to the certification of 
funds. (Investment 
Certification and Approval)  
defense agency requests pending 
Defense Business Council approval of 
their problem statements. The report 
also cited the specific systems that were 
conditionally approved pending 
approval of their problem statements. 
Nevertheless, it did not disclose the 
results of business enterprise 
architecture validations that were to 
occur as part of the certification and 
approval process for fiscal year 2015.  
In addition, according to the April 2014 
guidance for investment certification 
and approval, upon receipt of an 
organization’s Organizational Execution 
Plan, the defense business council chair 
was to identify generally no more than 
three defense business systems to be 
assessed from a component’s portfolio. 
Once notified, the pre-certification 
authority was to have 5 working days to 
provide the assessment documentation 
used to assert business process 
reengineering or business enterprise 
architecture compliance. However, the 
guidance does not specify time frames or 
milestones for completing these 
validations.  
 
The Office of the DCMO also provided 
data from the system that maintains 
certification and approval information. 
These data showed that only two 
systems were certified and approved for 
FY 2014 without a business process 
reengineering assertion. The office also 
provided additional information about 
these systems explaining the rationale 
for not conducting business process 
reengineering.  
 
11. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the Deputy 
Chief Management Officer to 
develop a skills inventory, 
needs assessment, gap 
analysis, and plan to address 
identified gaps as part of a 
strategic approach to human 
capital planning for the Office 
 X The Office of the DCMO has taken some 
steps to address this recommendation. 
For example, it has developed a draft 
resource allocation plan, which 
identifies staffing profiles for each of the 
office’s directorates and their respective 
divisions. These profiles cite needed 
staff competencies and qualifications. 
However, the department has not 
 108 
GAO Report Implemented Partially Implemented GAO Assessment 
of the Deputy Chief 
Management Officer. (Other – 
Human Capital)  
developed a skills inventory, gap 
analysis, or plan to address identified 
gaps as part of a strategic approach to 
human capital planning.  
 
12. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the appropriate 
authority to ensure that 
complete documentation, 
such as root cause analyses, 
assessments of existing 
interfaces for reuse 
opportunities, and 
performance metrics related to 
the reengineering efforts, is 
provided as part of FY 2014 
certification and approval 
process for the Integrated 
Personnel and Pay System - 
Army (IPPS-A), Integrated 
Personnel and Pay System - 
Navy (IPPS-N), Air Force 
Integrated Personnel and Pay 
System (AF-IPPS), and 
Integrated Electronic Health 
Record (iEHR) investments. 
(Investment Certification and 
Approval)  
 X DOD has taken some steps to address 
this recommendation. For example, the 
department demonstrated that it had 
completed documentation, such as root 
cause analyses, assessments of existing 
interfaces for reuse opportunities, and 
performance metrics related to the 
reengineering efforts, and that the 
documentation was provided as part of 
the certification and approval process for 
the Air Force Integrated Personnel and 
Pay System investment. However, it did 
not demonstrate that such 
documentation was fully completed and 
provided as part of the certification and 
approval process for other systems. For 
example, DOD only demonstrated that 
partial documentation had been 
completed and provided for the 
Integrated Electronic Health Record 
investment.  
 
13. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the appropriate 
authority to determine 
whether funds were properly 
obligated under 10 U.S.C. 
2222(a)-(b) for systems for 
which appropriate business 
process reengineering 
assertions were not 
completed. (Investment 
Certification and Approval)  
  
 
X  Officials from the Office of the DCMO 
demonstrated that the department has 
addressed the intent of this 
recommendation. Specifically, while the 
department did not concur with the 
recommendation and did not make the 
recommended determination, it has 
taken mitigating steps to help ensure 
compliance with business process 
reengineering requirements. For 
example, officials stated that, as part of 
the FY 2013 certification and approval 
process, conditions were imposed by the 
investment review board requiring all 
components to submit a plan on how 
core defense business systems would 
become compliant with the act’s 
business process reengineering 
requirement. These officials also 
provided documentation showing that 
the department tracked these conditions.  
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Article I. In addition, the 
department has reported much higher 
levels of compliance with the act’s 
business process reengineering 
requirements in subsequent annual 
review cycles. For example, in May 
2013, we reported that, according to 
DOD, appropriate business process 
reengineering had been undertaken on 
only about forty-one (41%) percent of 
the approximately 1,200 systems for the 
FY 2013 certification reviews. In 
contrast, officials from the Office of the 
DCMO stated that only two (2) systems 
were certified and approved during the 
FY 2014 certification and approval cycle 
and six (6) systems were certified and 
approved during the FY 2015 
certification and approval cycle that did 
not have complete business process 
reengineering assertions. Moreover, 
these officials provided justifications for 
why each of these systems did not have 
complete business process 
reengineering assertions.  
 
GAO 14-486 
14. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the appropriate 
DOD management entity to 
define by when and how the 
department plans to align its 
business system certification 
and approval process with its 
Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution 
process. (Investment 
Certification and Approval)  
  
 
X  DOD has taken steps to align its business 
system certification and approval 
process with its Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution process. For 
example, according to the department’s 
February 2015 certification and 
approval guidance, Organizational 
Execution Plans are to include 
information about certification requests 
for the upcoming fiscal year as well as 
over the course of the Future Years 
Defense Program. All of this 
information is to be considered when 
making certification and approval 
decisions. In addition, the guidance 
states that the chair of the Defense 
Business Council will make 
programming and budgeting 
recommendations to the Office of Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation 
and the DOD Comptroller  
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15. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the appropriate 
DOD management entity to 
define criteria for reviewing 
defense business systems at an 
appropriate level in the 
department based on factors 
such as complexity, scope, 
cost, and risk, in support of the 





 X According to officials from the Office of 
the DCMO, the Defense Business 
Council primarily focused its attention 
on the non-military department business 
systems during the FY 2015 certification 
and approval process. Accordingly, the 
council relied on military department 
precertification authority reviews of 
their respective system portfolios to 
support council decisions. However, the 
department has not defined criteria for 
reviewing defense business systems at 
an appropriate level in the department 
based on factors such as complexity, 
scope, cost, and risk, in support of the 
certification and approval process.  
 
16. The Secretary of Defense 
should direct the appropriate 
DOD management entity to 
develop guidance requiring 
military departments and 
other defense organizations to 
use existing business 
enterprise architecture content 
to more proactively identify 
potential duplication and 
overlap. (Investment 
Management)  
X  DOD has developed guidance requiring 
military departments and other defense 
organizations to use existing business 
enterprise architecture content to more 
proactively identify duplication and 
overlap. In particular, the department’s 
April 2015 business enterprise 
architecture compliance guidance states 
that examining programs for potential 
duplication and overlap should occur 
during the problem statement 
requirements analysis process, which is 
to occur early in a program’s life cycle. 
In addition, the department’s December 
2014 problem statement requirements 
validation guidance calls for an 
enterprise architecture analysis to be 
conducted that is to determine if a 
capability already exists within the 
organization or elsewhere across the 
DOD. If a solution already exists, the 
problem statement sponsor is to direct 
that the existing solution be reused. In 
addition, officials from the Office of the 
DCMO demonstrated that its new 
Integrated Business Framework-Data 
Alignment Portal tool can be leveraged 
to identify potentially duplicative 
systems based on business enterprise 
architecture compliance information 
that has been entered into the system.  
Total 5 11  
Source: (GAO 15-627, 2015b, pp. 35-44) 
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Table 7.   DOTMLPF-P Constraints, “As-Is” State  
  
Category Impact 
Doctrine: • Federal Acquisition Regulation FAR 
• Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement DFARS 
• OSD, Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) 
• DOD Directives, 
• Component FAR Supplements 
• DPAP DCFO Joint Memo dated 9 Feb 2016 – DOD Standard 
Operating Procedures for Distribution of Contract Actions to 
Financial Systems 
• DPAP DCFO Joint Memo dated 9 Feb 2016 – DOD Requirements 
Overview for Procure-to-Pay Data Exchanges One through Four 
• DPAP Memo dated 27 Feb 2015 – Accounting and Reporting 
Contract Finance Payments 
• DPAP Memo dated 22 Apr 13 - Implementation of Defense-Wide 
Contract Clause Logic Service 
• DPAP Memo dated 23 Jan 13 - Release of Procurement Data 
Standard Version 2.4 
• USD(AT&L) Memo dated 14 Mar 2013 - Traceability of Contract 
Execution Expenditures for Services 
• DPAP Memo dated 23 Jan 13 - Release of Procurement Data 
Standard Version 2.4 
• USD(AT&L) Memo dated 14 Mar 2013 - Traceability of Contract 
Execution Expenditures for Services 
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• DPAP Memo dated 12 Apr 2012 - Implementation of Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Provision and Clause 
for Warranty Tracking of Serialized Items 
• DPAP Memo dated 11 Apr 2012 - Implementation of Government 
Furnished Property Attachments to Solicitations and Awards 
• DPAP Memo dated 26 Jan 2012 - Data Capture in Support of 
Contingency Planning 
• USD(AT&L memo dated 21 Oct 2011 - Department of Defense 
(DOD) Functional Contract Writing and Administration Capabilities 
• USD(AT&L/DPAP) memo dated 31 Aug 2011 - Defense-Wide 
Contract Clause Logic Capability 
• USD(AT&L/DPAP) and USD(C/DCFO) Joint Memo dated 25 May 
11 -Internal Controls for Procurement Systems 
• DPAP Memo dated 23 Nov 10 - Publication of Draft Data Standards 
for Warranty Data and Government Furnished Property 
• DPAP DCFO Joint Memo dated 8 Jul 10 - Action Plan for 
Automating Required Agency Report of DOD Expenditures Funded 
by the ARRA of 2009 
• DPAP Memo dated 8 Jul 10 - Contract Indexing Standard 
• ASD(A) Memo dated 18 May 10 - Publication of a Purchase 
Request Data Standard 
• DUSD(AT&L) Memo dated 28 Jul 09 - Publication of Procurement 
Data Standard (PDS), Phase II 
• USD(AT&L) and USD(C) Joint Memo dated 18 Mar 09 - Linking 
• Financial Data to Contract Documents 




• Mandatory contracting procedures are locally interpreted and may 
contribute to inconsistent, or untimely, implementation of policy and 
regulation contributing to errors and use of non-standard processes 
Organization: • Local administration of contracting processes in legacy contract 
writing systems contribute to inconsistent interpretation of guidance 
and regulatory non-compliance. 
• Headquarters organizations lack the ability to quickly assess the 
‘health’ of the contracting process due to difficulty in rolling up and 
analyzing data from hundreds of contracting sites. 
• Local control contributes to proliferation of local ancillary 
applications and  workarounds leading to issues with data quality 
Training: • Functional training is fairly structured and taken in discrete steps 
during the career. 
• “As Is” environment lacks on-demand training (particularly in the 
use of IT tools) limiting productivity and drives inconsistent 
application of rules and controls. 
• The inability for contract specialists to move from one contracting 
organization to another without significant “retraining” due to the 
use of different contract writing systems and business processes at 
the gaining location. 
• Training in basics of contract writing, historically provided as on the 
job training has suffered through lack of emphasis, workforce 
shortages, lack of training materials, and doctrinal gaps. 
• Limited or no refresher training offered or required for legacy CWS 
• Training material and business processes are created around existing 
system gaps and constraints resulting in the establishment of 
processes specific to each legacy system as work-a-rounds 
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• Numerous manual data entry points for same data field throughout 
multiple databases contributing to data integrity issue, transactional 
errors and poor documentation. 
Materiel: • The “As Is” environment is characterized by multiple legacy 
systems supporting portions of the contracting enterprise with 
limited interoperability, data integrity, and flexibility. 
• Legacy contracting systems are technically fragile, will not support 
the user base, and have capabilities that are non-functional or lag the 
latest regulatory guidance given their posture of ‘bare bones 
sustainment’ for many years. 
• Operational contracting mission will be adversely affected with 
Standard Procurement System (SPS) retirement (the only DOD 
enterprise CWS) given lack of suitable replacement in current 
systems environment thus characterizing the “As Is” as high risk 
after SPS retirement. 
• In addition to SPS, legacy contract writing systems include: Contract 
Writing System (ConWrite), and Automated Contract Preparation 
System (ACPS) within the Air Force and for a limited set of DLA 
ACPS users in organizations formerly under the Air Force; 
SEAPORT, PRISM and ITIMP within the Navy; PADDS and SNAP 
within the Army, with DLA having a few PADDS users at formerly 
Army offices and SPS users at former Navy offices; several legacy 




• Knowledge of strategic objectives and availability of tools and job 
aids is spotty. 
• High error rate due to manual data entry caused by limitations in 
interfacing systems, emphasis on functional rather than application 
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training, and lack of leadership emphasis on data quality across the 
enterprise results in erratic contract quality. 
• Limitations of existing legacy systems, both in terms of 
technological fragility and overall capability results in multiple data 
entry, and shortcuts for system limitations. 
• DOD has established working groups for Business Process 
Reengineering (e.g. Informational Line Items; information 
exchanges between financial management and contracting systems) 
to review and evaluate opportunities for standardization within 
electronic transactions and between processes that will improve data 
integrity and accuracy 
• Procurement supports focused efforts to build upon and promote a 
collaborative relation between the financial, contracting, and 
customer communities to strengthen data exchanges to ensure 
efficient and effective outcomes that enable transparency and 
auditability of financial data linked to contract actions. 
Personnel • Changes in workforce demographics and experience have been 
exacerbated by extended periods of overseas deployment for a large 
portion of the enlisted contracting workforce, contributing to a 
highly stressed workforce severely impacted by vacancies, 
deployments, retirements, etc. 
Facilities: • Geographic dispersal of contracting workforce and specialization of 
the workforce at tactical locations impede workforce development 
and our ability to balance workloads across DOD contracting. 
Policy:  • Policy stems from applicable law and emanates down through 
regulations and doctrine. 
• Policy is managed at all levels of the contracting infrastructure with 
a reliance on periodic inspections, file reviews and other methods to 
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assess compliance, reliance on checklists leaves reviews subject to 
local interpretation since legacy has few internal controls and 
business rules enforced as part of implementation of existing 
material solutions. 
 
Source: Strategic Plan for Defense Wide Procurement Capabilities (A Functional 
Strategy), Version 2.1 page 22  
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Table 8.   Enterprise Level Systems 
 
System or 




DFARS PGI 204.201  
(DFARS Case 2012- 
P016) requires use for 
distributing contract 
awards to EDA, 
accounting systems, 
entitlement systems, 
logistics systems, and 
MOCAS. 
The Global Exchange Service (GEX) provides 
data transportation, translation, and validation 
services to business systems across DOD. The 
primary role of the GEX is to minimize the cost 
and complexity of interface management by 
providing a standards based mediation capability 
between systems. This enables systems using 
different generations of technology to 
communicate and eliminates the need for each 
system to build new interfaces for each trading 
partner. Instead, each system builds a standard 
interface to the GEX for each type of transaction, 
and all trading partners interface via the GEX with 
all systems engaged in that type of transaction. By 
limiting the number of interfaces each system 
needs to build, the GEX reduces costs 
exponentially. For example, if a dozen systems 
needed to interact with each other for a particular 
business process, the number of interfaces 
required without GEX is 132. With GEX this is 
reduced to one per system, for a total of twelve.  
 
The second capability GEX brings to the Procure 
to Pay business process is the ability to centrally 
monitor certain aspects of contract quality. The 
Procurement Data Standard and Purchase Request 
Data Standard implementations reject transactions 
that fail to meet the requirements of the data 
standards. Each rejected transaction results in a 
detailed error message showing all the errors 
within that transaction. The PDS implementation 
also includes warning messages for problems that 
do not violate the standard but may violate other 
business rules. Weekly reports generated by GEX 
summarize the successes and failures by system 





Service Name Policy Capability 
PDS and PRDS 
validation 
service (GEX) 
- This service enables a contract writing system to 
use GEX to validate that the contract action 
conforms to all enterprise edits prior to award and 
validates data after obligation but prior to posting 






- SAM converted three legacy systems to a new 
service in SAM called Vendor Management. 
These legacy systems were: Central Contractor 
Registration (CCR) (the primary database for 
business partners of the U.S. Federal 
Government); Excluded Parties List System 
(EPLS) (listed the parties excluded from Federal 
Procurement and Nonprocurement programs); 
and the On-line Representations and 
Certifications Application (ORCA) (electronic 
Representations and Certifications process).  
 
All prospective contractors and awardees for 
assistance and grants must register in SAM. 
Within SAM, the Contracting Office reviews the 
offerors’ information such as the offerors’ Dun & 
Bradstreet Universal Numbering System (DUNS) 
number, Contractor and Government Entity 
(CAGE) code, and Taxpayer Identification 
Number (TIN). SAM also includes a vendor’s 
size, type, category of business and financial and 
tax reporting information. In addition, parties 
excluded from receiving Federal contracts or 
certain subcontracts and from certain types of 
Federal financial and nonfinancial assistance and 
benefits are listed in SAM. Vendor 
Representations and Certifications are also 




Supports the FAR, 
DFARS, and any level 
of agency supplement, 
provided that the 
agency supplement is 
published in accordance 
with FAR 1.301 and 
1.5. 
A centralized clause-generating capability 
utilizing intelligent business logic has been 
developed for Defense Contract Writing Systems. 
The new service replaces the multitude of clause 
generating systems/processes currently in place 
within DOD. This service enables the functional 
community to directly manage the logic and 




Service Name Policy Capability 
The clause logic service can be used in either of 
two ways. A purely manual interface is available 
through which users answer a series of questions 
and are presented with a list of recommended 
provisions and clauses. An automated interface 
allows the contract writing system to answer most 
questions before passing the user to the service to 




FAR 5 and 6.305 FedBizOpps is the Government wide point of 
entry for disseminating information on proposed 
contract actions. The system collects, maintains, 
and disseminates information on Federal 
procurement solicitations to the public. The 
system also collects voluntary contact information 
(email address) on individuals and company 
information on vendors who use FedBizOpps to 
find and respond to Federal business opportunities 
for their products and/or services. This 
information is used to administer and manage 
Federal buyer access, maintain interested vendor 
lists, and keep vendors informed of Federal 
solicitations of business interest. FedBizOpps is 






requires that all contract 
writing systems send all 
contract actions 
electronically to EDA 
as 
Portable Document 
Format (PDF) files and 
as data in either the 
PDS, ANSI X12, or 
both. 
(The last option is being 
retained to provide a 
partial degree of data 
visibility for 
transactions 
The Electronic Document Access system: 
 Is the Central contract document repository. 
 Stores Portable Document Format and PDS 
copies of contract actions. 
 Conformance engine to apply contract 
modifications to awards to create a view of the 
contract as modified. This includes routing the 
resulting modified contract to GEX to validate 
against PDS business rules. Draft contract 
modifications can be sent prior to signature via 
GEX to EDA to ensure the resulting modified 
contract will meet PDS rules. 
 Pre-populates invoices and receiving reports in 
Wide Area WorkFlow (see DFARS 252.232-
7003). 
 Stores contract attachments and makes data 
available from attachments posted as structured 
data [Spring 2013]. 
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that fail PDS validation)  Stores contract documents intended for broad 
distribution. 







- EDA Version 8.4 added the ability to store 
documents pertaining to a contract that are not 
part of the contract. This capability creates a 
separate “folder” in which to place documents that 
are intended to be shared by all parties 
participating in a contract, such as letters and 
progress reports. Documents can be sent to the 
administration document folder by either direct 
upload or via GEX. 
 
FPDS FAR 4.6 FPDS receives and stores contract award reports. 
Contract writing systems create a contract award 
report based on data in the contract writing 
system, and then connect the user to FPDS to 
complete the report. FPDS provides the ability to 
look at data on contract actions awarded by the 
federal government. Further, it provides 
opportunity for the government to better assess 
where its money is being spent, thereby offering 
opportunities to better determine how to most 
effectively and efficiently expend those resources. 
It is also relied upon to create recurring and 
special reports to the President, Congress, 
Government Accountability Office, federal 






- DPAP has developed a business intelligence 
system that brings together data from several 
enterprise systems to produce reports on 
individual contracts and on aggregated data from 
across many or all contracts. Business intelligence 
reports on specific contracts, such as a delivery 
status report showing scheduled deliveries from 
the contract in EDA and actual deliveries from 
WAWF will be posted to the EDA Administration 
Document folder on a scheduled basis. 
 
MOCAS  The MOCAS supports contract administration 
and payment when contract administration is 
delegated outside the procuring office. It is 
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recommended for use as an entitlement system for 
complex contracts even in cases where 
administration has been retained because it is able 
to correctly pay contracts with cost type 
provisions, financing payments, and mixed 
funding that many other entitlement systems 
process manually or not at all. Contracts are 
provided to MOCAS via GEX as ANSI X12, 
either directly or by translation. There are a large 
number of contract and contractor status reports 
available in MOCAS. DPAP is reviewing which 
of those should be posted to the EDA 
Administration Document Folder to ensure 













FAR 32.7 and DFARS 
232.70, 245.103-72 
The iRAPT application is part of the Wide Area 
Workflow e-Business Suite. (iRAPT was 
formerly known as WAWF.) iRAPT is a secure 
web based system for electronic invoicing, 
receipt, and acceptance. iRAPT allows vendors to 
submit and track invoices and receipt/acceptance 
documents over the web and allows government 
personnel to process those invoices in a real-time, 
paperless environment. It is also the only 
application used to capture the Unique 
Identification (UID) of Tangible Items 
information and Radio Frequency Identification 
information.  
 
In 2015, the WAWF eBusiness Suite absorbed the 
functionality once hosted and maintained 
separately by DFAS’ myInvoice system. 
Absorbing this capability as a module within 
WAWF, maintains a single face to industry (in 
terms of invoicing) and allows vendors to now 
login to WAWF to understand the status of their 
invoices based on information provided by the 
accounting and entitlement systems in a uniform 
standard fashion. 
 
Source: Department of Defense, Strategic Plan for Defense Wide Procurement 
Capabilities (A Functional Strategy), Version 2.1, 2016, p. 32. 
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